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I. INTRODUCTION
Any student of our Constitution learns very early that the legal
significance of its provisions cannot be determined by reference to
the words of the document itself. The Constitution has meaning as
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a legal force only to the extent courts give it that effect,' and the
courts to which litigants most frequently bring constitutional is-
sues when there is a choice available are federal courts." At the
apex of the federal court system is, of course, the United States
Supreme Court, which is not only the supervisor of that court sys-
tem but is also the ultimate authority on the legal meaning of the
Constitution.3 In this article the focus on the Supreme Court as a
constitutional lawmaker is not intended as a denigration of the im-
portance in this regard of other federal courts, state courts, or of
nonjudicial governmental bodies, but as a recognition of the
unique power and prestige of the Supreme Court in the formula-
tion of law through discovery of the meaning of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court is unique as a constitutional authority both
1. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall first declared the existence of
the power of judicial review, that is, the power of courts to interpret and apply the Constitu-
tion as the supreme law in cases before them. He reasoned that the Constitution was estab-
lished as the fundamental law by the people, who possess the ultimate authority to deter-
mine the nature and limits of their future government. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). If an act of government is contrary to the Constitution, it thus
represents action beyond that authorized by the people as the ultimate sovereign and must
be void. Id. at 177-78. Since it is undeniably the function of courts to decide cases by the
application of law, they must have the power to determine what rules are law. It follows,
therefore, that courts must be able to determine whether a pertinent rule is inconsistent
with the Constitution, and to do so they must be able to determine the meaning of the
applicable constitutional provision in order to discern any conflict between it and the perti-
nent rule. Id. at 178-79.
2. The federal district courts have original jurisdiction over cases arising under the
Constitution. This judicial power is authorized by article III of the Constitution and has
been conferred by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). One
important inducement for choosing to initiate constitutional challenges in federal court is
the independence federal judges have from popular control. Federal judges of article III
courts are appointed for life and their compensation cannot be reduced during their term.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Federal jurisdiction over constitutional issues is not, however,
exclusive of state courts. For example, many constitutional questions arise in defense of
criminal prosecutions in state court.
3. The Supreme Court is the only federal court directly established by the Constitution
and is authorized by it to exercise appellate review of cases arising under the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST. art. III. As a practical matter, the Court is the final authority on the Con-
stitution because it possesses the power to review the judicial decisions on constitutional
issues of other courts. The power to review lower federal court decisions has been conferred
by Congress in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254 (1976). The Supreme Court also has power under 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) to review decisions on constitutional issues by state courts. This grant
of power was held to be constitutional in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816). In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the Supreme Court held that it
could also constitutionally exercise the power to review state criminal proceedings and that
the eleventh amendment did not restrict that power.
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because of its power to create constitutional law and because of its
symbolic position in this society as bearer of the Constitution as
aegis.4 It is not, therefore, surprising that this body of nine ap-
pointed Justices5 is the focus both of constitutional scholarship
and of the criticism aimed at constitutional law.
One of the most important areas of constitutional law is that de-
rived from the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. One author has noted that the substantive doctrine concern-
ing equal protection and that concerning freedom of expression
have become the two most important categories in the whole
corpus of constitutional law.' Governmental decisionmakers must
consider equal protection doctrine since they are frequently re-
quired to discriminate among those arguably qualified in order to
determine who must bear the burden of governmental action or
receive the benefits of governmental largess. A decision to discrimi-
nate is often the result of political compromise, limited objectives,
limited resources, prejudice, or a blend of these reasons; and this
failure to treat equally all those who are arguably similarly situ-
ated as to those burdens or benefits prompts equal protection
challenges.
The Supreme Court has, however, provided inadequate guide-
4. Alexander Bickel described this as the "mystic" function of the Supreme Court. A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 32 (1962). The Court not only protects freedom
with the Constitution through judicial review but also is symbolically joined with the Con-
stitution because it alone, among governmental bodies, can personify the continuity repre-
sented by the Constitution. See id. Also, because of its independence and continuity, the
Supreme Court is in a better position to elaborate the essential values contained in the
Constitution even in the face of popular hostility. Philip Bobbitt refers to this as the expres-
sive function of the Court, whereby it gives "concrete expression to the unarticulated values
of a diverse nation." P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 211
(1982).
5. The Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Court consisted of only six
members when it was originally established and this number was changed to seven in 1807,
to nine in 1837, to ten in 1864, and finally to nine in 1869. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, &
E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3507, at 19-22 (1975). Presently the Su-
preme Court consists of a Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
6. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (1982).
7. "A major legislative program may require hundreds of decisions, which will be ex-
pressed as statutory classifications. Any of these classifications may be challenged as deny-
ing equal protection." Developments In the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,
1076 (1969).
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lines for determining such challenges.8 The Court has developed a
multi-tiered approach whereby different tests are used according
to the degree of "suspectness" attached by the Court to the type of
classification being challenged.' One bringing a challenge under
equal protection must first place the challenged classification in a
suspect category in order to make the government justify its classi-
fication. The government, of course, must argue that the chal-
lenged classification is not one of those which has been deemed
suspect or should be deemed suspect so as to enjoy the application
of the lowest tier approach which favors it.10
8. The inadequacy of a tiered approach to equal protection analysis has lead not only to
confusion of those who must use these rules but also to extensive fragmentation of the
Court itself. See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1977). As Mr. Karst has noted,
"Surely we are near the point of maximum incoherence of equal protection doctrine." Id. at
3.
9. Gerald Gunther noted in 1972 that the Burger Court had begun to go beyond the
rigid two-tier approach to use equal protection even when the challenged classification was
not "suspect." This development he described as the giving of new "bite" to equal protec-
tion without applying strict scrutiny. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972). Justice Marshall has contended that the Court's equal
protection decisions no longer fall into a pattern that can be explained by the Warren
Court's two tiers. Instead, the Court has applied a spectrum of standards which "compre-
hends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifi-
cations, depending . . . on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest ad-
versely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. In McGowan v. Maryland, the Court upheld a Sunday closing law which banned
the sale of certain products while allowing the sale of others. Chief Justice Warren stated
that equal protection is violated only when the classification is based on grounds "wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to
have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws
result in some inequity." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). This kind of
economic regulation is, therefore, to be considered valid under equal protection "if any state
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id. at 426. If there are plausible reasons
for a classification, it is constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning did actually moti-
vate the enactment of that classification. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 179 (1980). The Court has, however, at least in dictum indicated recently that
some patently irrational discriminations may not withstand even the deferential rational
basis test. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 441-42 (1982) (separate opin-
ion by Blackmun, J.). Although it is often said that the lowest tier of equal protection analy-
sis applies to general economic or social welfare regulation, the more accurate view is that
judicial scrutiny will be applied only when the Supreme Court finds reason to be especially
suspicious of a particular type of classification. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422, 426 (1982) (claimant denied a hearing because of the hearing commission's own delay).
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Under the Warren Court's two-tier analysis the government had
the heavy burden of justification whenever a classification was cat-
egorized as one made either on the basis of such suspect character-
istics as race or nationality or in regard to interests the Court saw
as "fundamental," such as voting, interstate migration, or access to
criminal justice.11 If the classification was not one of those to which
the Court applied "strict scrutiny," deference was given the legisla-
tive choice so that all doubts were resolved in favor of constitution-
ality.12 On this lower tier the challenged classification was pre-
sumed constitutional, while a classification on the upper tier was
presumed unconstitutional. The placement of a case on one tier or
the other was exceedingly significant under the Warren Court's
analysis since these presumptions were, in reality, almost
irrebuttable."
The Burger Court added alienage classifications to the Warren
Court's list of those inherently suspect 4 but has subsequently
qualified the significance of this designation by determining that a
state may legitimately reserve for citizens those positions in gov-
ernment that involve the formulation or implementation of broad
public policy decisions.15 The Burger Court has also identified
other bases which require "heightened" judicial scrutiny but which
are not so inherently suspect as to require the strictest scrutiny. 6
11. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1,
8-10 (1972).
12. The only case between the late 1930's and today in which the Supreme Court used
equal protection to strike down a purely economic regulation was Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957). That decision was held erroneous and overruled by the Court in New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam).
It would seem.., that in fiscal and regulatory matters, the Court has not only enter-
tained a presumption of constitutionality and placed the burden on the challenging
party to show that the law has no reasonable basis, but has in fact almost abandoned
the task of reviewing questions of equal protection.
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065, 1076 (1969).
13. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HIv. L. REv. 1,
8 (1972).
14. "[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are in-
herently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example
of a 'discrete and insular' minority." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
15. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 76-78 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1978).
16. The very deferential standard was expressly held inapplicable to illegitimacy classi-
19831
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For instance, classifications based on gender are at least suspicious
in that many prove to be unjustified in the Court's analysis but are
not inherently suspect. 7 To describe equal protection analysis to-
day, therefore, one must speak of at least a three-tiered rather
than a two-tiered approach.' 8 Classifications on the highest tier are
given the strictest judicial scrutiny, those on the middle tier are
given heightened scrutiny, and those on the lowest tier are given
virtually no scrutiny.
Although the Burger Court has not added to the Warren Court's
list of fundamental interests, 9 it applied heightened scrutiny in
the Plyler" case to what was described in the dissent as a "quasi-
suspect" class harmed by discrimination in regard to a "quasi-fun-
damental" interest.2' In the Zobel2 2 case the Court struck down a
state preference for long-term residents even though this prefer-
fications in 1977. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977). The Warren Court had, how-
ever, begun this trend earlier. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). In 1976 the
court determined that gender-based classifications must serve an important governmental
objective and be substantially related to that objective. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977). As Justice Powell noted in
Craig, such classifications require a "more critical examination" than would be applied to
classifications that were neither suspect nor relating to fundamental interests. See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (Powell, J., concurring).
17. In Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan suggested that
because sex is an immutable and obvious characteristic which has nothing to do with one's
abilities and because women, on account of their sex, have been the victims of pervasive
discrimination, any gender-based classification should be deemed suspect. 411 U.S. 677, 686-
87 (1973). A majority of the Court did not accept this placement on the highest tier but did
vote to strike the challenged gender-based classification on the basis of Reed v. Reed. See id.
at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 691 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
18. In Reed v. Reed the Supreme Court struck down a gender-based classification while
purporting to apply only the rational basis, lowest tier test. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). This
language implicating as it does the deferential approach cannot, therefore, adequately ex-
plain the lack of deference given the state by the Court. One can only conclude that the
Court saw some reason to be suspicious of gender-based classifications such that some de-
gree of searching examination short of the strictest scrutiny was required. This heightened
scrutiny falls somewhere between the lowest and highest tiers established by the Warren
Court. See Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and The Three
Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 951 (1975).
19. In the Rodriguez case the Court refused to find that public education was a funda-
mental interest. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Fur-
thermore, Justice Powell stated that an interest is not fundamental so as to require strict
scrutiny unless it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33-34.
20. Plyler v. Doe, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982).
21. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2409, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 817.
22. Zobel v. Williams, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 72 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1982).
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ence did not deter interstate migration. Four Justices in the major-
ity, however, placed emphasis on the suspicious nature of any clas-
sification based solely on duration of residence."3
Even though classifications made on the basis of race are the
most vulnerable to equal protection challenge, 4 the Burger Court
has upheld a racial classification which was sufficiently related to
the goal of remedying the present effects of past discrimination
against blacks.2 5 This "benign" discrimination by Congress was
closely examined by the Court, but the level of scrutiny was not so
high as that given discrimination that disadvantages racial minori-
ties. 6 It may well be, as some members of the Court have openly
urged, that the level of scrutiny drops to the middle tier when ra-
cial discrimination operates in favor of a minority race for this be-
nign purpose."s Considering Fullilove and those cases decided since
1976 in which the Court has upheld even nonbenign gender-based
discrimination against males,26 it appears that the vulnerability of
a classification depends in large part on the nature of the disad-
vantaged class. To put it another way, a classification is deemed
suspect or suspicious primarily because its past uses are rather ob-
viously based on arbitrary preferences that disadvantage a usually
powerless group. When that group is not disadvantaged, the classi-
fication, though still subjected to scrutiny, is more likely to with-
stand equal protection analysis because it is more likely to have
arisen from rational decisionmaking2
23. "[R]esort to duration of residence as the basis for a distribution of state largesse
...closely track[s] the constitutionally untenable position that the longer one's residence,
the worthier one is of the State's favor." Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2318, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 685
(Brennan, J., concurring).
24. Indeed, Justice Stewart long contended that racial discrimination is by definition a
violation of equal protection. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart,
J., dissenting); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
26. "As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in the remedial context the
Congress must act in a wholly 'colorblind' fashion." Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
27. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun joined the majority in Fullilove but
used the "substantial relationship" test usually applied for middle-tier or heightened scru-
tiny analysis. See id. at 521 (Marshall, J., concurring).
28. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court of So-
noma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
29. Even a gender-based classification disadvantaging males will fall, however, if it is
based on "archaic and stereotypic notions" as to the proper place or role of men and women
in our society. See Mississippi Univ. For Women v. Hogan, - U.S .... 102 S. Ct. 3331,
3336, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 1098 (1982).
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It might seem to some litigants that the process of placing an
equal protection issue on the appropriate tier for analysis is as if
they had stepped into an elevator with the plaintiff pushing the
button for the highest floor and the defendant pushing the button
for the lowest. The elevator moves, however, not only in accor-
dance with the electric impulses received in this manner but also
in accordance with those received from some unknown source
which often causes the doors to open between floors. Following this
process one exits into a world of adjectives and adverbs which
would have perplexed even Alice after her adventures. For each
tier the applicable test is stated in terms of the relationship of the
challenged classification to a governmental purpose. On the lowest
tier the classification need be only rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental interest.30 To satisfy heightened but not strict
scrutiny, the government must prove its classification has a sub-
stantial relation to an important governmental interest;"1 and on
the highest tier it must prove the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling3 2 or overriding"3 governmental interest.
These modifiers can and have been on occasion replaced by others
which provide no greater clarity. In Fullilove34 Chief Justice Bur-
ger, in announcing the judgment of the Court, said that a congres-
sional program seeking to remedy the present effects of past racial
discrimination must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve that end."
Justice Powell, on the other hand, thought the means must be
"reasonably necessary" to achieve that end."' Justice Marshall did
not deem benign racial discrimination to be inherently suspect so
he applied the middle-tier analysis, requiring the program to serve
"important governmental objectives and [be] substantially related
to achievement of those objectives. 37 In Rostker v. Goldberg,8 the
draft registration case, Justice Rehnquist found that "[a]nnounced
degrees of 'deference' " and "levels of 'scrutiny' . . . may all too
30. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
31. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 271 (1978).
32. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
33. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
34. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
35. Id. at 480.
36. Id. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
38. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result."", He
then held, for the majority, that the registration of only males for
the draft was "not only sufficiently but closely related to Con-
gress's purpose in authorizing registration. '" 0
To understand why this uncertainty exists on the Court, one
must recognize that the Supreme Court develops equal protection
doctrine while in the midst of a fundamental constitutional de-
bate.4 ' On one hand there is the argument that the Court must
develop doctrine to deal with governmental inequality as it affects
people in society today. On the other hand there is the argument
that life-tenured judges who are not directly accountable to the
voters should not interpret the Constitution according to their own
values. Raoul Berger is perhaps as responsible as anyone for inten-
sifying this debate on the legitimacy of constitutional lawmaking.42
His argument is twofold. First, he contends the specific intentions
of the framers of the fourteenth amendment are clear and show
limited objectives.43 In addition, he argues that the Court cannot
legitimately cause the Constitution to have legal effect beyond
those specific intentions.
The nine Justices of the Supreme Court must decide difficult
modern equal protection cases which frequently involve emotion-
ally charged issues having important implications while debate sur-
rounds their power to mold constitutional protection according to
the conditions of this age. Considering this background and the
disparate philosophies of the Justices, it is not at all remarkable
that "bright line" rules have not evolved.
II. ORIGINAL INTENT
45
The Congress voted to propose the fourteenth amendment on
39. Id. at 69-70.
40. Id. at 79.
41. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703-06
(1975).
42. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION O THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
43. See id. at 407.
44. See id. at 408.
45. There exists a rather serious question whether anyone today can hope to accurately
discern the intent of the majority of the people responsible for the proposal and ratification
of the fourteenth amendment. See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Origi-
nal Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of
1983]
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June 13, 1866,4' and the proposal was formally submitted on June
16." The southern states were required by statute to adopt the
fourteenth amendment as one of the conditions for obtaining rep-
resentation in Congress,48 but the ratification process was still
more unusual in that several northern states attempted to rescind
their earlier ratifications.4" On July 9, 1868, after ratification by the
required number of states Congress by resolution requested Secre-
tary of State Seward to submit a list of the ratifying states."0 He
did so by proclamation on July 20, 1868, noting that two states had
History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CH. L. REV. 502 (1964). A distinction can
be made in this regard between the Thirty-Ninth Congress which proposed the fourteenth
amendment and the state legislatures which ratified it. Who, in other words, are the "fram-
ers" of the fourteenth amendment? The state legislatures, representing the people of the
United States, were responsible for making the amendment part of the Constitution and,
after all, it is the people's Constitution not Congress's. Logically, therefore, the understand-
ing of these bodies as to the meaning they intended to become part of the Constitution
should be controlling. See C. ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT v-vi (1981). These state legislatures, however, did not maintain verbatim
records of their debates on the fourteenth amendment and their intent can only be gleaned
from evidence such as governors' messages, committee reports, records of motions and votes,
and from newspaper reports of the legislative debates. See id. at v; C. FAIRMAN & S. MORRI-
SON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY
162 (1970). Without direct evidence showing the specific concerns of those legislatures, there
tends to be greater support for the conclusion that the ratifiers took the Equal Protection
Clause as it read, that is, as a more general prohibition of inequality. See C. ANTIEAU, THE
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 46-47, 58-60 (1981). Others have
dealt with this lack of evidence by assuming the state legislatures had notice of the intent of
the Thirty-Ninth Congress and, in effect, adopted its intent through their ratification. See
Bickel, The Original Understanding And The Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7
(1955). This issue is beyond the scope of this article because of two reasons. First, assuming
the original intent cannot be sufficiently proved-and a further issue would arise in defining
"sufficiently"-does not justify ignoring original intent as a restriction on the exercise of
judicial review. The burden can be placed on the proponent of an equal protection right to
prove the framers intended such a right to exist. Failure to prove intent sufficiently would
then result in failure of that constitutional challenge. Second, the specificity of the concerns
of the framers has been admitted so as to allow concentration on the real issue, which is
whether their specific intentions in 1867 or 1868 should control our Constitution in 1983 or
our children's Constitution in succeeding years.
46. See Bickel, The Original Understanding And The Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1955).
47. See 14 Stat. 358 (1866).
48. See 14 Stat. 428 (1867); C. FAIRMAN & S. MORRISON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY 206 (1970).
49. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1939); C. FAIRMAN & S. MORRISON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY 168-
69, 178 (1970).
50. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 448 (1939).
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attempted to rescind their ratifications."' On July 21 Congress nul-
lified these attempted rescissions by declaring the fourteenth
amendment was part of the Constitution. Finally, on July 28, 1868,
Seward proclaimed it adopted.2 This congressional decision on the
legality of the attempts to rescind a prior ratification was ulti-
mately deemed controlling by the Supreme Court when it held
that such matters were political questions as to which Congress
possessed the final authority."'
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment begins by establishing
the rule that all persons born or naturalized in the United States
are citizens thereof, thereby overruling the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Dred Scott v. Sanford. 4 It then proceeds to prohibit the
states from abridging the privileges or immunities of United States
citizens, from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, and from denying any person the equal
protection of the laws."' Section 5 of the amendment grants Con-
gress power to enforce these and the other provisions of the four-
teenth amendment."
Even in the absence of any legislative history, one would assume
that the Thirty-Ninth Congress would not have proposed such a
significant addition to the Constitution unless motivated by the ex-
istence of serious immediate concerns. Acting in the aftermath of
the Civil War, which had been caused at least in part by the slav-
ery issue, and the recent ratification of the thirteenth amend-
ment,57 Congress was confronted by activity in some southern
51. Id. at 448-49.
52. Id. at 449.
53. Id. at 450.
54. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967).
55. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
57. The thirteenth amendment was declared to have been ratified on December 18,
1865. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMENDED, H.R. Doc. No.
539, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 14 (1976).
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states which reestablished many of the legal deprivations charac-
teristic of slavery. These southern states had, in the winter of
1865-66, passed what were known as Black Codes. Although the
codes varied from state to state with some even providing rights to
blacks not previously enjoyed, others prohibited blacks from own-
ing land, voting, engaging in any activity other than domestic ser-
vice, or leaving their jobs without suffering the forfeiture of earned
pay." The members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress viewed the more
restrictive of the codes as representative of all and pointed to their
enactment as evidence that an unrepentant South was seeking to
reestablish substantially the same system that had been one of the
causes of the Civil War. 9
Congress had, on April 9, 1866, overridden the veto of Andrew
Johnson to enact into law the Civil Rights Act of 1866,60 which
expressly provided the right to "citizens, of every race and color"
to make and enforce contracts, be parties in court, to own and con-
vey real and personal property, to enjoy the full benefit of all laws
for the security of person or property enjoyed by white persons,
and to be subject to like punishment and none other."' Many
Republicans, including Bingham of Ohio who was the primary
draftsman of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, believed the
Civil Rights Act was beyond the constitutional power of Con-
58. See J. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 506
(1971); Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under
the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L.
REv. 462, 474 (1982).
59. See generally J. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
509 (1971).
60. Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982 (1976)).
61. The original version of section 1 read as follows:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States;
and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof of the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like pun-
ishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
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gress. 2 This concern and the belief that the rights enumerated in
the Civil Rights Act should not be left to the mercy of later Con-
gresses6 s fueled the move to propose what became the fourteenth
amendment."
When considered apart from the other clauses in section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment, the Equal Protection Clause reads, "No
State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'65 The words are general and when read
literally express no limitation on the equal protection which states
are forbidden to deny. Raoul Berger argues, however, that limited
meaning should be ascribed to these words because the evidence
shows that the members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were moti-
vated to propose them so as to secure for blacks only that equality
provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.66
It is not disputed that in proposing the fourteenth amendment
Congress was strongly motivated by a concern for blacks and for
the equality of their treatment under state law in regard to the
particular rights or privileges enumerated in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.0 Furthermore, the debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
support the conclusion that its members did not intend by its rati-
fication to bring about political equality in regard to the right to
vote or run for public office or the social equality of the black and
white races." Considering this evidence, Alexander Bickel con-
62. See Bickel, The Original Understanding And The Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 22 (1955).
63. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 23 (1977); C. FAIRMAN & S. MORRISON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY 125 (1970).
64. See J. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 511
(1971); Bickel, The Original Understanding And The Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 24 (1955); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding Of "Equal Protection Of
The Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 140 (1950).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 169 (1977); see also C. FAIRMAN & S. MORRISON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY 125-26 (1970).
67. See Bickel, The Original Understanding And The Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 58 (1955); see also C. FAIRMAN & S. MORRISON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY 142-43 (1970).
68. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 170-71, 410-11 (1977).
Thus, the original understanding of the equal protection clause-actually, of section
one in its entirety-was that it forbade every state to discriminate against any of its
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cluded that section 1 of the fourteenth amendment was not meant
by these men to apply to jury service, suffrage, antimiscegenation
statutes, or segregation. 9 In summary, the debates in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress indicate that those who proposed the fourteenth
amendment intended the Equal Protection Clause as an immediate
protection for blacks in regard to a limited number of rights and
only to the extent those rights were enjoyed by whites.70
Alexander Bickel has argued, however, that though this evidence
would be conclusive as to the interpretation of a statute, the four-
teenth amendment is something quite different and the framers
were necessarily aware of that difference.7 1 He suggests that one
reason the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not simply use the language
of the Civil Rights Act in their proposal is that they were aware it
was a constitution they were writing-an organic document that
because of its unique function and permanence must contain lan-
guage which allows for unforeseen future problems. Thus, the lan-
guage of the Equal Protection Clause itself indicates that the
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress also intended to do pre-
cisely what they did do-propose a general constitutional prohibi-
tion of inequality under law. This generalized prohibition was to
operate, however, as an ideal in that it would await implementa-
tion as novel problems arose.72 This visionary purpose did not in-
residents on the basis of race with respect to certain sorts of rights (and the protec-
tion of those rights)-those pertaining to physical security, freedom of movement,
and capacity to contract and own property. Of course, by contemporary lights, the
original understanding of equal protection is exceedingly narrow.
Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1023, 1027-28 (1979).
69. Bickel, The Original Understanding And The Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 58 (1955).
70. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 179 (1977); C. FAIRMAN & S. MORRISON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY 157 (1970).
71. See Bickel, The Original Understanding And The Segregation Decision, 69 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 59 (1955).
72. Id. at 63.
[Bingham's] framing of the fourteenth amendment provides additional evidence that
the phrases of section 1 were intended to be broad, not narrow; general, not specific;
open-ended, not limited. Unless Bingham is to be entirely discounted, his framing
also counsels that the text of the fourteenth amendment is constitutional in scope,
not statutory in precision.
Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the
Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L.
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terfere with the need to deal with the immediate concerns or fears
of the framers because achievement of the ideal through lawmak-
ing would remain in the hands of Congress through its section 5
power. Of course, it was known that advances could be made by
the Supreme Court, but the framers had no reason to believe at
the time that the Court would move too rapidly in achieving their
vision of perfect equality. 3
III. BEYOND ORIGINAL INTENT ON RACE
Although the Supreme Court did not move rapidly after the rati-
fication of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 to pursue an ideal of
equality, it did soon begin to take a view of equal protection
broader than was justified by the framers' specific intent. In fact,
one characteristic of the Court's dealings with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is that it has always exercised some degree of discre-
tion in determining the demands of equal protection. Whatever
one may argue the Court ought to be doing, it has from the begin-
ning not decided equal protection issues solely through analysis of
the historical evidence of the original intent.
In the Slaughter-House Cases7 4 in 1873, the Court for the first
time discussed the Equal Protection Clause.7 In this decision, the
Court noted that the language of the fourteenth amendment was
not limited to the protection of blacks7' but held that history
clearly showed that it was primarily meant to protect that race
from the oppressions experienced immediately after the Civil
War." The Court expressly refused to declare that no other group
could enjoy this protection but said that a strong case would have
to be presented before other groups could be protected.s In
Strauder v. West Virginia,7 9 the Court in 1880 reversed the convic-
tion of a black man because West Virginia defined "eligible" jurors
REV. 462, 494 (1982).
73. See Bickel, The Original Understanding And The Segregation Decision, 69 HABV.
L. REV. 1, 64 (1955).
74. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
75. See id. at 66-73, 80-82.
76. See id. at 71-72.
77. See id. at 81.
78. See id. at 81.
79. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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to include only white males.80 The Court said that although the
Equal Protection Clause speaks in general terms, it implies "an im-
munity from inequality of legal protection, either for life, liberty,
or property."'81 This immunity included the right to be free from
racial discrimination in regard to the selection of one's jurors. This
list of "immunities" as to which racial discrimination was prohib-
ited was, perhaps, not meant to add anything to the list of inter-
ests (or rights) with which the framers were concerned, although
evidence exists to indicate that the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not
wish to grant blacks the right to serve as jurors."2
To point up the injustice of the West Virginia law, the Court in
Strauder used a hypothetical case in which blacks became the ma-
jority in a state and precluded white males from serving on juries.
In such a case, the Court concluded, no one would contend this
was not a "denial to white men of the equal protection of the
laws"8' because this kind of discrimination was inconsistent with
the "spirit of the amendment."' The Court also saw the state's
discrimination against blacks to be "a brand upon them, affixed by
the law," a legal assertion of their inferiority that would be "a
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to secur-
ing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims
to secure to all others."86 The Court was discussing the injustice of
excluding black males from the list of eligible jurors, but this lan-
guage and the hypothetical indicate the Court had begun to recog-
nize that any law which disadvantaged a group solely because of
race was inconsistent with the essential meaning of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
In 1886 the Court decided Yick Wo v. Hopkins."' In that case a
80. See id. at 304, 312.
81. Id. at 310.
82. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 158, 239 (1977). But see Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptu-
alization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (1979).
83. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
84. Id. at 308.
85. Id. at 308. Michael Perry finds this language in Strauder to be suggestive of a
broader understanding by the Court of equal protection, that is, when any law affixes such a
"brand" it must fall. The Court as early as 1880, therefore, had begun to stray from the
confines of the original intent. See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization
and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1028-29 (1979).
86. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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San Francisco County ordinance prohibited the operation of a
laundry in a wooden building without the consent of the board of
supervisors.8 7 Three hundred and ten of the laundries in the
county, out of a total of three hundred and twenty, were con-
structed of wood. 88 Yick Wo and approximately two hundred other
Chinese aliens who had been operating their laundries in wooden
buildings sought permission to continue operation, but all of their
petitions were denied. On the other hand, all of the petitions save
one addressed to the board of supervisors by those who were not
Chinese were granted.89 Subsequently, Yick Wo and more than one
hundred and fifty of his countrymen were arrested for operating
their businesses without permission.' 0
The Court in Yick Wo held that the fourteenth amendment ap-
plies to protect all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of a
governing entity "without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws." 1 The Court said that even
though a law is fair and impartial on its face, if it is administered
"with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar cir-
cumstances, material to their rights" this amounts to a denial of
the equality required by the Constitution.2 No justification having
been shown for the manner in which this ordinance was adminis-
tered, the Court was forced to conclude that no reason existed ex-
cept "hostility to the race and nationality" of Yick Wo. The dis-
crimination was, therefore, a denial of equal protection.' The
Court reasoned that it was the essence of slavery and, therefore,
the contradiction of freedom that "one man may be compelled to
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential
to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another . . .94
The San Francisco ordinance could be justified as a reasonable
attempt to promote fire safety, but the administration of it could
87. See id. at 357.
88. See id. at 358-59.
89. See id. at 359.
90. See id. at 359.
91. Id. at 369.
92. Id. at 373-74.
93. See id. at 374.
94. Id. at 370.
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not be so explained. The Supreme Court noted that it need not
engage in speculation as to the operation of the ordinance since the
facts of discriminatory administration were shown."' These facts,
in turn, illustrated that the primary motive for this discrimination
was hostility toward Chinese aliens.96 Although it can be said that
the discrimination was based on the race of the affected classes,
the nationality and alien status of the disadvantaged class also
caused the Court to suspect that hostility or bias had motivated
those who administered the ordinance. As the Court put it, "Can a
court be blind to what must necessarily be known to every intelli-
gent person in the State?""
In 1896, the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson," from which was
derived the rule that a law requiring separate but equal facilities
for blacks was not a violation of equal protection. In that case a
challenge was made to a Louisiana law that required all railway
carriers to provide equal but separate accommodations for the
white and black races." Homer Plessy had insisted on being seated
in a coach for white passengers because he claimed he was seven-
eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African, but he had been ar-
rested because the authorities either did not believe him or
thought seven-eighths was not sufficient.100 The Supreme Court
concluded that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to pro-
vide only political equality of the races before the law as opposed
95. See id. at 373.
96. The courts ordinarily do not engage in psychoanalysis of a legislature or of govern-
mental officials to determine an "evil" motive. As Justice Cardozo noted, this is a "wise and
ancient doctrine." United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardoza, J., dis-
senting). It is a wise doctrine because this kind of analysis probably cannot be managed by
judges or, if it could, be applied to a collection of legislators or officials to determine conclu-
sively or even convincingly a collective dominant motive or purpose. Even if standards ex-
isted for the effective use of this mode of analysis, its use would be an unseemly intrusion
into the area of legislative power and would likely cause legislators to become more secretive
of the purposes of reasoning behind legislation. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 208-10 (1962). In Yick Wo, however, the Court was able to see the "unequal hand"
of government through the objective facts of the ordinance's administration and no psychoa-
nalysis was required to determine motive. See id. at 213. What else but racial prejudice
could cause the denial of a license to all Chinese and the grant of a license to almost all
whites when the Chinese laundries were as safe as those owned by whites?
97. 118 U.S. 356, 363 (1886).
98. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
99. See id. at 540.
100. See id. at 541-42.
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to social equality. 101 Political equality, as the Court viewed it, was
affected only when the law's differentiation between the races "im-
plied a legal inferiority in civil society" which reduced .the black
race to its previous condition of servitude. 0 2 The fallacy the Court
saw in Plessy's challenge to the segregation required by Louisiana
law was that his argument assumed that "enforced separation of
the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferi-
ority." 103 The Court reasoned that even if this were so, "it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it."'' 0 One would as-
sume that if the decision did depend on whether a badge of legal
inferiority was imposed by the law, the Court should have also ex-
amined the legitimacy of this construction by blacks; but it did
not.
The equal protection issue was thus reduced to whether the Lou-
isiana law was a reasonable regulation. The Court held that, con-
sidering the "large discretion" enjoyed by the legislature, that body
could justify its action by "reference to the established usages, cus-
toms and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promo-
tion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and
good order."' 0 5 In other words, since the people wanted separation
of the races in public facilities, the state could require it through
law. 10 6 Moreover, the Court concluded the races could not be
forced to commingle through law since "[1]egislation is powerless to
eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon
physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.' ' 0 7 Whatever
the justification for this conclusion, it was largely irrelevant to the
101. See id. at 544.
102. Id. at 545.
103. Id. at 551. In Strauder the Court had described the denial to blacks of the right to
serve on juries as a "brand . . . affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
104. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
105. Id. at 550. Peace and order would presumably be served because the law reduced
the likelihood that white people would need to resort to violence to exclude black people
who might wish to sit in cars with whites. In other words, to avoid lawless action by whites,
blacks were excluded by law from railway cars in which whites were seated.
106. See id. at 551. The "people" to whom the Court referred could only have included
those white people who did not wish to share a railway car with blacks, since the Court
recognized that black people may view this separation as a sign of their inferiority.
107. Id. at 551.
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constitutional issue presented in Plessy. Plessy did not seek to re-
quire the Louisiana legislature to mandate the commingling of the
races, only not to mandate the separation of the races. Without
this law, the races could have commingled on railway cars as they
wished, and any commingling which did occur would be the result
of private choices not of governmental compulsion.
One need not engage in psychoanalysis to realize that the Louisi-
ana legislature separated the races because of the wish to keep
blacks out of the cars in which whites would sit.10 8 The first Justice
Harlan, in his now famous dissent in Plessy, made this point by
noting that it was obvious to all that the Louisiana law "had its
origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from
railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people"
from those occupied by whites.10 9 His position was that "[o]ur
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." 0 Since the Louisiana law was obviously intended
and had the effect of maintaining a class system based on race, he
found it inconsistent with that equality guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment."' Justice Harlan looked backward from the
law's separation of the races to find that this separation was en-
acted because of the wish to exclude blacks. In other words, he saw
what the majority failed to see or refused to admit, that the Louisi-
ana legislature was moved to segregate because of racial prejudice
against black people. It was this motive which to him made the law
a violation of equal protection even though the law itself only re-
quired separate but equal facilities for the races.
The separate-but-equal analysis used in Plessy made constitu-
tionally irrelevant the state's reason for legally-enforced separation
of the races in public facilities. The Court could not have otherwise
ignored "what must necessarily be known to every intelligent per-
son,"" 2 that is, that the Louisiana law was enacted to exclude a
whole race because it was perceived to be degraded and unworthy
108. If only one passenger car were available, the railroad was required to divide it by
constructing a partition. Railroad officials were also prohibited from using their discretion in
this regard and were subject to criminal penalties for failing to separate the races. See id. at
552-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
112. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 363 (1886).
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of sharing public accommodations with whites. Laws establishing
racial segregation quite literally put blacks "in their place," but
the Court in Plessy made this realization irrelevant by imposing an
abstract logic which began with the irrebuttable presumption that
if equal facilities were provided no violation of equal protection
could exist."' One weakness of this rule as a protection for segre-
gation did finally become significant when the Court began to give
greater scrutiny to unfounded claims that equal facilities were be-
ing provided, especially in regard to educational opportunities; ""
however, for nearly sixty years this presumption, which was con-
tradicted by all pertinent empirical evidence, allowed the white
majority in numerous states to bar blacks from full enjoyment of
public services and facilities. This presumption was finally excised
from the law in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.115
In Brown the Court was squarely confronted with the validity of
the separate-but-equal rule because the record showed that the ra-
cially-segregated public schools in question were substantially
equal in regard to tangible items.1 6 The Court held that racial seg-
regation in public schools was a violation of equal protection,11 7
113. The Louisiana law considered in Plessy expressly required railroads to provide
"equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races." Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (emphasis added). The Court did not consider whether the railway
car available to Homer Plessy was an equal facility, presumably because he was arguing that
he should not be separated regardless of the facilities available. Considering only the face of
the statute one might, therefore, be led to the conclusion that no "inequality" had been
created since both races were treated to "equal" facilities.
114. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 639, 642 (1950)
(Oklahoma statute requiring that blacks enrolled at institutions of higher education at-
tended by whites be segregated violated right to equal protection of the laws); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631-32, 636 (1950) (violation of Equal Protection Clause to deny qual-
ified blacks admission to University of Texas Law School, offering instead admission to
newly established state law school for blacks); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (per curiam).(Equal Protection Clause requires that blacks qual-
ified to enter state professional school be admitted); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337, 349-50 (1938) (repugnant to fourteenth amendment to afford whites in-state legal
education but require black residents to go out of state).
115. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
116. See id. at 492.
117. See id. at 495. In a companion case the Court held unconstitutional segregation in
the public schools in the District of Columbia. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500
(1954). Since this segregation was the result of federal law, the fourteenth amendment
which restricts the action of states was not directly applicable. The Court determined that
the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment, which does restrict the federal government,
includes an equal protection component since both due process and equal protection stem
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but this decision was not based on the conclusion that the framers
intended such a result since the Court found the evidence of origi-
nal intent to be inconclusive. " ' The Court reasoned that the sepa-
ration of black children in public education generates a "feeling of
inferiority," especially because it is mandated by law, which causes
them to suffer from a lack of motivation to learn.11 ' Such laws,
therefore, hindered the educational development of black children
and thereby deprived them of educational benefits white children
enjoyed.12 0 Thus, the Court concluded, separate public schools for
the races could not be equal or be made equal because separation
itself deprived black children of equal educational opportunities.
from the "American ideal of fairness." Id. at 499. The Court reasoned that "it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Govern-
ment" than on the states. Id. at 500. Whatever may be the persuasiveness of this reasoning,
the Court did not find its conclusion in the intent of the framers or in the language of the
fifth amendment. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 32-33 (1980).
118. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). Raoul Berger sees this
statement in Brown as a "veiled declaration" that the Court was ignoring the framers' in-
tent so as to "revise" the Constitution in light of modern problems. R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 131 (1977). One
can just as accurately say that the Court applied the constitutional mandate of equal protec-
tion in light of the society existing in 1954 when the Brown case was decided rather than in
light of the conditions prevailing in 1867 or 1868. Berger's description is framed so as to
support his argument that the meaning or mandate of equal protection should be deter-
mined solely by strict adherence to the framers' specific intent in proposing and ratifying
the Equal Protection Clause as part of the fourteenth amendment. The second description
is founded on a recognition of the limits that should be placed on the constitutional signifi-
cance of the framers' intent:
The notion that the framers' specific intentions define an inviolable core of constitu-
tional meaning . . . founders upon the same difficulty as to the notion, more clearly
rejected by history, that those intentions establish the outer limits of permissible con-
stitutional development: the issues for which subsequent generations have sought
constitutional answers are not those that the framers addressed.
More fundamentally, we live in a world that they could not have contemplated,
even in fantasy.
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1068-69 (1981).
119. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
120. See id. at 494. The Court used as evidence for this proposition psychological and
social science materials. See id. at 494 n.11. If the Court's decision in Brown does rest on
this evidence of harm to black children in that this alone shows unequal treatment, does the
inherently-unequal rule collapse when new, contradicting social science evidence arises? See
Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-58 (1955). The answer is no because the
Court could still find, as did Justice Harlan in Plessy, that the dominant motive for segrega-
tion was racial prejudice and whether quantifiable educational harm was caused thereby
would be irrelevant.
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Being "inherently unequal," segregation of the public schools was
necessarily in violation of the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws."'1
Although the Court stressed the importance of public education
in Brown, calling it the "most important function of state and local
governments," 1 2 it subsequently struck down laws which segre-
gated public facilities of lesser importance.2 8 These later cases
show that the inherently-unequal rule is tied neither to education
nor to the psychological harm caused blacks by legal separation of
the races. If separation of the races is inherently unequal regard-
less whether the facilities provided blacks are equal and regardless
of the interest affected, the conclusion that inequality exists must
derive from the intention of the governmental agency responsible
for segregation rather than from any quantifiable effect of the law
itself. The Court realized in Brown, as Justice Harlan had realized
in Plessy, that laws separating the races in public facilities were
unequal because they were the result of a purposeful exclusion of
blacks from the facilities used by the politically dominant white
race. Since these laws would not have been enacted but for the
intention to implement the belief by whites that blacks were not
worthy enough to associate with them, one must conclude that seg-
regation laws achieved for whites the benefits they sought at the
expense of the powerless black race. Thus, when racial prejudice is
the primary motivation for a law segregating the races that law is
always unequal in its treatment of the groups.
Perhaps if candor had seized the majority in Plessy, those men
would have been forced to recognize that the Louisiana legislature
had assumed blacks as a class were too impure, unclean, or unwor-
121. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
122. See id. at 493.
123. See Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (segregation prohibited in
courtroom); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (law requiring
segregation of publicly operated restaurant held invalid); New Orleans City Park Improve-
ment Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), af/'d per curiam, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (city
cannot segregate public park); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), vacated per
curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (city cannot segregate municipal golf course); Dawson v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), affd per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (segregation
prohibited at public beach); Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963), a/'d per
curiam, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (segregated city auditorium prohibited); Dorsey v. State Ath-
letic Comm'n, 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958), af'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (seg-
regation prohibited at athletic events); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), af/'d
per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (segregation prohibited on city buses).
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thy to associate with the white race and that this hopelessly broad
and unexamined assumption was the impetus for the legislature's
separation of the races in railway cars. As Justice Harlan realized,
these laws "proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so in-
ferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
coaches" with whites."14 Since the same assumption was the mov-
ing force behind the segregation of public schools, the Supreme
Court did not even discuss in Brown any purported justification
for the states' action. Segregation was, therefore, inherently une-
qual because it was obviously intended to be so; and it was a viola-
tion of equal protection because bias in regard to race was deemed
unacceptable by the Court as a motive for legal classification.
IV. BEYOND RACE
A. Classification Based on Alienage
In Truax v. Raich," the Supreme Court held invalid under
equal protection an Arizona law which required all employers of
five or more employees in the state to hire at least eighty percent
native-born citizens or qualified electors.1" Raich was a resident
alien whose job was to be terminated because of this law.', The
Court conceded that a state may favor its own citizens when it had
a "special public interest" in doing so, such as in regard to the
regulation or distribution of the public domain, common property,
or the resources of the people of that state but found the Arizona
law not to be so limited.128 Since no special reason for protecting
124. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
126. See id. at 35.
127. See id. at 36.
128. See id. at 43. The special public interest doctrine concerned three particular types
of public interests. First, a state was deemed to have a special interest justifying preference
for its own citizens in regard to employment on public works even to the extent of prohibit-
ing the employment of aliens. See Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915); Heim v.
McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 193 (1915). A state could also, consistent with equal protection, pro-
hibit aliens from taking its wild game. See Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144-45
(1914). The people of a state were said to have a special property right in this "common
property," such that the taking of wild game was not a general privilege or immunity. See
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395 (1877). A state also possessed the power to prohibit
aliens from inheriting immovable property located in that state. See Blythe v. Hinckley, 180
U.S. 333, 341-42 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1880).
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citizens existed and the challenged provision affected every busi-
ness with more than five employees regardless of the nature of bus-
iness done, the Court concluded that the reason for the classifica-
tion was a bias in regard to the affected classes. 129
In 1971 in Graham v. Richardson'" the Court announced that
classifications based on alienage were "inherently suspect" and
would be subjected to strict scrutiny.' 3' The laws challenged in
Graham prohibited the grant of state welfare benefits to aliens.132
The Court noted that the disadvantaged aliens were as needy as
resident welfare recipients and otherwise as qualified for the bene-
fits. The Court, noting the tendency of states to favor their own
citizens,'3 3 found the alien class to be a "discrete and insular" mi-
nority for whom judicial concern was appropriate. 3 4 Aliens, like
blacks, form a distinct, isolated class so that they can be more eas-
ily separated from the populace at large as the focus of governmen-
tal hostility. Moreover, since aliens constitute a powerless minor-
ity, without even the right to vote, none of the usual political
restraints exist which would cause legislators to question their own
biases or to fear acting on that basis. Considering these factors
against the background of the inequalities to which aliens had
been subjected, the Court had reason to be suspicious of the state's
129. The Court found sufficient evidence of this bias in the statute itself.
The purpose of an act must be found in its natural operation and effect [citations
omitted), and the purpose of this act is not only plainly shown by its provisions, but
it is frankly revealed in its title . . . . It is an act aimed at aliens, as such, in the
businesses described.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1915).
130. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
131. See id. at 376. Although the fifth amendment's requirement of due process re-
quires the same type of equal protection analysis applicable to state action when federal law
is challenged, the federal government has unique interests and responsibilities in regard to
aliens which may justify its classification on that basis when such action could not be consti-
tutionally undertaken by a state. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
Because the federal government has a variety of legitimate and important reasons for deal-
ing with aliens differently, the Supreme Court will not presume those actions are invidious.
See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-80 (1976). In other words, the Court has less reason
to be suspicious of alienage classifications by Congress and will analyze these according to a
lesser or narrower standard of review. Id. at 81-82.
132. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366-67 (1971). As an alternative ground
for the decision, the Supreme Court held that these state laws encroached on the exclusive
power of the federal government to control the admission of aliens. See id. at 377-78.
133. See id. at 371-72 & n.5.
134. See id. at 372.
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motives in denying needy alien residents welfare benefits and rea-
son to scrutinize the justifications proffered for this treatment." 5
The states argued that their discrimination was justified solely
by their special public interest in favoring their own citizens in the
grant of state money. " a The special public interest doctrine stood
for the proposition that the citizens of a state were more deserving
of certain special benefits provided or controlled by that state. 37
The Court held that this doctrine was insufficient as a legitimate
basis for classifying in regard to alienage because it was based on
the fiction that a privilege, as opposed to a right, can be restricted
for citizens; but the Court had previously rejected the notion that
constitutional rights can be made to depend on whether a benefit
is labeled a "right" or a "privilege.'1 38
The Court also held that concern for the fiscal integrity of their
welfare programs was not a sufficient justification for the states'
discrimination against aliens. " 9 Although saving taxpayers' money
is a legitimate governmental purpose, that purpose does not ex-
plain why the savings were to be obtained at the expense of some
needy residents simply because they were aliens. The facts in Gra-
ham do support the inference that aliens were chosen because of
the perception of that class as somehow less deserving of these
benefits. In the language of the Court's decision in Yick Wo, the
alien plaintiffs in Graham were being subjected, as to their means
of living, to the "mere will" of the state legislatures because no
other motive independent of the wish to favor citizens and disfavor
aliens existed to explain and to justify denying them welfare
benefits.
Strict scrutiny as applied in Graham is significant because it
means the Court will refuse to accept conclusory statements by the
state in justification of an already suspect classification. The state,
therefore, had to persuade the Court that the reason for the dis-
tinctions made in these laws was not hostility toward aliens or,
viewed another way, favoritism toward citizens. What is most sig-
nificant is that the Court was dealing with a type of classification
135. See id. at 371-72.
136. See id. at 372.
137. Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915).
138. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
139. See id. at 375-76.
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which it had good reason to suspect might well be based on an
arbitrary decision. History, judicial experience, and the nature of
the classes affected would lead most people to suspect that the
state legislatures involved were likely to have been motivated by
bias rather than a rational determination of relevant qualifications.
By 1978 the Court had, however, held that a state could without
violating equal protection reserve for citizens "state elective or im-
portant nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions. '140
Being responsible for the formulation and execution of public pol-
icy decisions, these governmental officers are the ones who, in a
real sense, run the government through their discretionary author-
ity.14 1 It is reasonable for voters to insist that their governors be
persons who have some minimum permanent alliance to this coun-
try and its form of government through the status of citizenship.
Reserving these government positions to those who are citizens is
not, therefore, seen by the Court as being motivated primarily by
the assumption that aliens in general are less deserving. 42
B. Classification Based on Gender
In 1971 the Court was confronted with a challenge to an Idaho
140. This language comes from dictum in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 635, 643,
647 (1973). The Court first upheld an alienage classification supported by this justification
in Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978).
141. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
142. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1982) (California statute requir-
ing peace officers be citizens held constitutional; therefore, state could limit probation of-
ficers as peace officers to citizens); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73-74 (1979) (New York
law preventing certification of aliens as public school teachers not violative of equal protec-
tion); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296-97 (1978) (New York law requiring state police be
United States citizens not violative of equal protection).
When a state seeks to justify an alienage classification by alleging it serves such a sover-
eign function, it must satisfy a two-step test. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440
(1982). First, the state must show that its restriction is not "so broad and haphazard as to
belie the. . . claim that it is only attempting to ensure that an important function of gov-
ernment be in the hands of those having the 'fundamental legal bond of citizenship.' "Id. at
442 (emphasis added). The barring of aliens from any permanent position in a wide variety
of state civil service jobs, some involving policy making and some involving only menial
labor, would be too broad. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). Second, the
state must be able to show that the position reserved for citizens is one which carries with it
the power to formulate or execute broad public policy decisions. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1982). Lawyers are not officers of the government in this sense so
aliens cannot be prevented from being admitted to the bar. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 733
(1973).
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law which required the appointment of a male petitioner as admin-
istrator of an estate whenever a male and female, standing in the
same relation to the deceased, filed competing petitions."" In this
case, Reed v. Reed, the adoptive parents of a deceased child filed
competing petitions to be named as administrator of his estate;
and the state court, finding both possessed the minimum qualifica-
tions but without determining the relative capabilities of the two,
chose the father on the basis of this state law. 44 The Supreme
Court declared that since the Idaho law provided such different
treatment solely on the basis of sex, it was "subject to scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.' 45 Without explaining why it
was suspicious of such classifications, the Court proceeded to in-
quire into the justification for this disparate treatment. The state
argued that its objective was to provide a means by which such
contests could be resolved without requiring a hearing on the rela-
tive merits of the petitioners, which would add expense and delay
to the process. The Court held that, although reduction of the
workload of courts was a legitimate goal, this end could not be ac-
complished by giving one sex an absolute preference. 41
Two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson,147 Justice Brennan,
in an opinion joined by three other Justices, explained that our
country has had a long history in which discrimination against
women has been rationalized on the basis of the perceived need to
protect them from the harshness of reality. 48 On this basis laws
were justified which prevented women from holding office, serving
on juries, suing in their own name, or, as married women, holding
property."4 ' He also noted that sex was a characteristic that, like
race and nationality, was determined by birth not choice and,
therefore, rarely had any relevance to an individual's "ability to
perform or contribute to society" or to that individual's other qual-
ifications or merit. 50 Because of this history, he reasoned, classifi-
cations based on gender should be considered suspect and sub-
143. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72-73 (1971).
144. See id. at 73.
145. See id. at 75.
146. See id. at 76.
147. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
148. See id. at 684-85.
149. See id. at 685.
150. See id. at 686.
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jected to strict judicial scrutiny. Although the Court held the law
challenged in Frontiero to be in violation of equal protection, i" ' a
majority of the Justices did not support Justice Brennan's conclu-
sion that sex was a suspect classification.'
It was not until 1976 that the Court finally described the stan-
dard to be used in determining the constitutionality of gender-
based classifications. " The Court in Craig v. Boren declared that
classifications based on gender "must serve important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.' 54 In his concurring opinion, however, Justice
Stevens expressed skepticism about the tiered analysis of equal
protection challenges, viewing it as more of an explanation of re-
sult than a standard for decision. He went on to say that he sus-
pected "that a careful explanation of the reasons motivating par-
ticular decisions may contribute more to an identification of that
standard than an attempt to articulate it in all-encompassing
terms."'55
C. Classification Based on Illegitimacy
In 1968 the Supreme Court decided two cases, Levy v. Louisi-
ana 15 and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance
Co.,' 57 in which classifications based on illegitimacy of birth in a
Louisiana statute were held to be in violation of equal protection.
151. See id. at 691.
152. Justice Stewart concurred only in the judgment, citing Reed. See id. at 691 (Stew-
art, J., concurring). Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
found it unnecessary to characterize gender as a suspect basis for classifications. See id. at
691 (Powell, J., concurring).
153. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
154. See id. at 197. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court in which this stan-
dard was announced, and Justices White and Marshall joined without opinion. Justice Pow-
ell wrote a concurring opinion in which he expressed some concern about Justice Brennan's
broad interpretation of Reed but agreed that gender-based classifications should be sub-
jected to a higher level of scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis/due deference ap-
proach. See id. at 210 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun concurred in Justice Bren-
nan's opinion except to the extent of the discussion of the twenty-first amendment. See id.
at 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens accepted this middle-tier approach
though he expressed concern for the tiered approach as a whole. See id. at 211-12 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
155. See id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
156. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
157. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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The Levy case arose when a suit was brought on behalf of illegiti-
mate children to recover for the wrongful death of their mother. 158
The Louisiana wrongful death statute allowed a "child" to bring a
suit for the death of a parent, but the Louisiana courts defined this
term to include only legitimate children. 159 On the basis of the re-
cord the Supreme Court found that the deceased was the natural
mother of the children for whom the suit was brought, that she
had lived with and supported them as a mother, and that she had
acted in every other way as a mother of the children. 6" It also de-
termined that illegitimate children were "persons" within the
scope of the Equal Protection Clause regardless whether the state
viewed them as nonpersons in the legal sense. 6'
The critical issue in Levy was framed by the Court in the follow-
ing terms:- "When the child's claim of damage for loss of his
mother is in issue, why, in terms of 'equal protection,' should the
tortfeasors go free merely because the child is illegitimate?""' Or,
to put it another way, since the illegitimate children were subject
to all of the responsibilities that must be borne by legitimate citi-
zens, why would a state legislature deprive them of the right to
recover damages solely because they were born to parents who
were not married? The Court answered its question in Levy by
concluding that illegitimacy of birth is no reason at all for denying
children their interest in recovering for the harm done their
mother.163
A mother was suing in Glona for the wrongful death of her son,
and the same Louisiana statute prevented her from recovering
solely because the son was illegitimate.6 4 The Court recognized
that the state was classifying on this basis so as to punish for the
commission of the sin of extramarital sexual intercourse.6 5 In
Glona, unlike Levy, the party who had committed this sin was be-
ing deprived of the statutory benefit. 66 Nevertheless, the Court
158. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69 (1968).
159. See id. at 70.
160. Id. at 70.
161. Id. at 70.
162. Id. at 71.
163. See id. at 72.
164. See Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 74 (1968).
165. See id. at 75.
166. See id. at 75.
[Vol. 14:829
EQUAL PROTECTION
determined that creating a windfall for tortfeasors who cause the
death of illegitimates, which was the effect of the Louisiana law,
was an irrational way of punishing the sin of extramarital sexual
intercourse. 1 7 Furthermore, under the Louisiana statute the
mother could have recovered for the wrongful death of a legitimate
child even though she might also be the parent of another illegiti-
mate child, that is, be obviously guilty of the sin. 168 The right to
recover under the Louisiana statute was also a property right
which could ordinarily be inherited; but grandparents, although in-
nocent of the sin, were deprived of a right to recover for the death
of the illegitimate offspring of their children.169 In this way Justice
Douglas's statement for the Court was clearly true-the fact of the
illegitimacy of a tort victim became a total windfall for the
tortfeasor responsible for his or her death. The life of an illegiti-
mate child was thereby rendered less valuable than that of a legiti-
mate child even though the child could not be responsible for the
wrongdoing which allegedly prompted the state's action. The
state's reason for such unequal treatment was its concern for sin,
but to the extent the Louisiana law punished illegitimates the
state's sole motive could only have been based on the assumption
that those children were, as a class, morally sullied by their par-
ents' wrongdoing and, therefore, less worthy than legitimate
children.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in both cases, expressed perplexity in
the face of the Court's rulings that Louisiana could not make dis-
tinctions on the basis of this legal status since the existence of a
biological relationship alone provided no greater proof of lost love
or lost economic support.1 70 Justice Douglas responded by pointing
out that the issue was not which relationship was more rational
but whether the state could justify its classification solely on the
legitimacy status of children;171 therefore, when a state gives value
to a child's life or gives a child the right to recover for a parent's
life, it cannot deny these rights or that value to children who are
otherwise equally qualified solely because they are deemed morally
167. See id. at 75.
168. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69 n.1 (1968).
169. See id. at 69 n.1.
170. See Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S 73, 79-80 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (dissent also applies to Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)).
171. See id. at 75-76.
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unworthy as a class. The Court did not choose the biological rela-
tionship over the legal relationship; it instead denied the state
power to treat so differently two children when both had enjoyed
the same living arrangements or relationships with their mothers,
solely because one was labeled in law as illegitimate because of no
fault of his own.
When, however, the arbitrary assumption of unworthiness does
not appear to be the primary moving force behind such legislative
enactments, the Court has allowed classifications on the basis of
illegitimacy to stand.171 When a state imposes a more onerous re-
quirement on one claiming to be the illegitimate child of a man
who has died without leaving a will, the state may well be moti-
vated by the need to provide for the orderly disposition of prop-
erty at death. Also under these circumstances there exists the dan-
ger that unscrupulous persons could by making false claims extort
settlements from the legitimate heirs. To allow these claims on the
same footing as any other would make estates vulnerable to such
extortion because the alleged father, being dead, could not dispute
the claim. Moreover, no inference can ordinarily be drawn against
paternity just because the claimant had not cohabited with or been
supported by the deceased. Experience shows that the male parent
of an illegitimate child often neither cohabits with nor supports
such children; and, unlike mothers who give birth, there would not
exist any medical evidence definitely connecting the father with
the child.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Lalli v. Lati, contended that
the state might under these circumstances simply increase the
usual burden of proof from a preponderance of the evidence to a
standard requiring clear and convincing evidence, thereby allowing
true claims by illegitimates while reducing the danger posed by
false ones.173 The Court held, however, that the state need not do
the best possible job in assuring that all natural children recover.
It reasoned that equal protection does not focus on fairness in the
abstract "but on whether the statute's relation to the state inter-
ests . . . is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by
the Fourteenth Amendment.1' 74 Since it is the Supreme Court
172. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
173. See id. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 273.
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which will ultimately decide whether the relationship is so "tenu-
ous" as to lack sufficient "rationality," the crucial question, at least
when judicial scrutiny is applied, is how does the state prove ra-
tionality or, conversely, how does the challenger prove insufficient
rationality.
In Trimble v. Gordon the challenged Illinois law allowed an ille-
gitimate child to recover from his father's estate only if the father
and mother had intermarried and the father had also acknowl-
edged the child. 17 Deta Trimble had been judicially declared the
child of Sherman Gordon during his lifetime, and he was ordered
to pay for her support.176 She was prevented from inheriting from
his estate through intestate succession solely because he had never
married her mother.1 7 Viewing the operation of the law in this
case and assuming the legislature intended this result, it becomes
very difficult to conclude that the state was primarily concerned
with providing protection against spurious claims by persons al-
leged to be the illegitimate children of the deceased. The record in
Trimble more strongly supports the conclusion that the state was
primarily motivated by the assumption that illegitimate children
were morally or otherwise unworthy of sharing the estate with a
man's legitimate family unless he had cleansed them of their
"shame."
In Lati, a not overly generous New York law at least permitted
an illegitimate child to inherit if, during the father's lifetime, a
court of competent jurisdiction had declared his paternity in a pro-
ceeding initiated within two years after the child's birth. 7 8 The
Supreme Court was not concerned with the two-year limitation pe-
riod because no paternity proceedings had ever been initiated and
the question was not presented for decision.' The claimant in
175. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764-65 (1977).
176. See id. at 764.
177. Cf. id. at 765.
178. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1978).
179. See id. at 267 n.5. A one-year limitation on paternity suits, running from the birth
of the child, was held a violation of equal protection in Mills v. Habluetzel. See - U.S. -,
__, 102 S. Ct. 1549, 1556, 71 L. Ed. 2d 770, 779 (1982). There is also reason to believe that
even longer periods which were not in accord with those allowed for support claims by legitil
mate children would be unconstitutional. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d at
782 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring); id. at
__, 102 S. Ct. at 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 782 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Pickett v.
Brown, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, - L. Ed. 2d - (1983) (two-year limitation period on
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Lalli had filed with the state court a notarized document signed by
the alleged father in which he, in consenting to the claimant's mar-
riage, referred to the claimant as "my son." There were also affida-
vits by others who swore the alleged father had openly acknowl-
edged the claimant as his son.180 The Court held that this
"evidentiary" requirement of the New York law was not so tenu-
ously related to the state's legitimate purpose as to lack sufficient
rationality.
It is difficult to discern the difference between the statute chal-
lenged in Trimble and the one challenged Lalli that prompted the
Court to find the latter but not the former sufficiently related to
the end of protecting estates against spurious claims.181 Both stat-
utes would be effective in avoiding the swearing match which
might otherwise occur if the claims of alleged illegitimate children
were allowed subject only to the usual preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. Both statutes prevented such claims even when
there existed credible evidence beyond the testimony of the claim-
ant to prove paternity.18 Justice Powell, writing for the Court in
Lalli, distinguished Trimble by arguing that the Illinois statute
was excessively restrictive of these claims while the New York stat-
ute in La li did not disqualify an "unnecessarily large number of
children born out of wedlock." '
He went on to explain this difference by noting the legislative
history of the statute in Lalli which "clearly illustrates" the state's
desire to protect the rights of illegitimates to the extent practicable
while also protecting estates from spurious claims." He concluded
that the New York law "represents a carefully considered legisla-
tive judgment as to how this balance best could be achieved." 88
Thus, he based his decision in Lati on the evidence which proved
the New York legislature had been motivated by "legitimate" con-
siderations. In writing for the Court in Trimble, Justice Powell saw
paternity suits by certain illegitimate children violates equal protection).
180. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 262-63 (1978).
181. In LalLi, Justice Blackmun argued that Trimble should be overruled because he
was not convinced by the plurality's explanation of the differences between the two cases.
See id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
182. See id. at 272-73.
183. Id. at 273.




the essential question to be whether the state's attempt was "care-
fully tuned" to its legitimate ends so as to not broadly discriminate
against illegitimates.'86 In that case, however, the Illinois statute
was so broad as to belie the legislature's claim that it had been
primarily moved to make such a classification by the fear of spuri-
ous claims.187
These two decisions did not turn solely on the degree to which
the state statutes adequately balanced the interests of illegitimates
and estates. 88 They turned instead on the Court's conclusion,
reached after considering the statutes and their operation, that the
legislature of New York had been primarily motivated by the de-
sire to deal with the danger of spurious claims while the legislature
of Illinois had not.
D. Classification in Regard to Voting
In Reynolds v. Sims'8 the Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits a state from diluting the weight of a citizen's vote
in regard to representation in the state legislature solely because of
that citizen's place of residence.1 90 In Reynolds, the rural-domi-
nated Alabama state legislature, though required to do so by the
state constitution, had failed to periodically reapportion itself to
reflect population shifts or growth.' 91 As a result, according to the
1960 census, 25.1% of the state's population resided in senatorial
districts from which a majority of the members of the Alabama
Senate were elected, and 25.7% of the state's population resided in
counties which could elect a majority of the members of the Ala-
bama House of Representatives. "I One county with a population
of 13,462 was represented by two seats in the House, while another
county with 314,301 residents had only three seats. One county
with a population of over 600,000 was represented by only one sen-
ator, while one senator also represented another county with only
15,417 residents. 9 '
186. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977).
187. See id. at 772-73.
188. Cf. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274 (1978).
189. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
190. See id. at 566.
191. See id. at 540-41.
192. See id. at 545.
193. See id. at 545-46.
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The Court declared that the concept of equal protection is to be
viewed as requiring equal or uniform treatment in regard to people
who stand "in the same relation to the governmental action ques-
tioned . . . . 9 Since there existed no question but that the vot-
ers in populous counties were as qualified as the voters in sparsely
populated counties, the only basis for diluting the effect of the
votes of the first group while inflating the effect of the votes of the
latter group was their respective places of residence. The Court
held that place of residence was not a legitimate basis for such
differentiation. 19
The Court also said that "[t]o the extent that a citizen's right to
vote is debased, he is that -much less a citizen." 19 It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the "right"or interest in equal voting power has
played a significant part in the use of Reynolds v. Sims as an equal
protection precedent. Looking beyond this important interest for a
moment, however, one can see two possible reasons for the Ala-
bama legislature's continuation of a system which gave preference
to rural voters at the expense of urban voters. First and most obvi-
ous, the members in control of the legislature, being dependent on
the existing system for their reelection and their continuing control
in the legislature, maintained the system because it was in their
personal and political interest to do so. In other words, the repre-
sentatives in the Alabama legislature continued the system because
it continued them in power. Second, their action may have been
influenced by the self-serving notion that rural residents were more
stable and more capable and, therefore, more worthy of controlling
state government.
The Court explained the need for its scrutiny by noting that
ours is a representative form of government which is nothing less
than "self-government through the medium of elected representa-
tives. 1 97 If government is to be truly representative, there must be
effective participation by every citizen. To argue that government
should be controlled by a minority of the qualified voters goes
against the very essence of this concept of representative democ-
racy. Moreover, to allow those who draw their governing power
194. Id. at 565.
195. See id. at 568.
196. Id. at 567.
197. Id. at 564-65.
[Vol. 14:829
EQUAL PROTECTION
from this minority-control system to continue it solely because it
serves their interests is to surrender some part of the people's right
of self-government.
Although the Court was prompted to consider this equal protec-
tion challenge because of the serious implications of the harm
caused, Alabama's classification was one which, because of of its
very nature, compelled the Court to suspect that the legislature's
motives were not legitimate. Once scrutiny was applied, the Court
needed only to hold that continuation of the existing system even
in the face of a state constitutional mandate to reapportion could
not be justified by legislative self-interest. As Justice Clark noted
in his concurrence, the Court needed only to find that the system
clearly revealed "invidious discrimination . ..and [is] therefore
violative of the Equal Protection Clause." 1"8 In addition, the as-
sumption that rural voters are more worthy of controlling govern-
ment must also fail as a justification since, as the Court stated,
"[a] citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because he
lives in the city or on the farm."' "
Two years later in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,2 "° the
Supreme Court cited Reynolds for the proposition that "any al-
leged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized. '" 01 Stating that the ability to pay a
fee has no relation to voter qualifications, the Court in Harper
held that a tax of $1.50 imposed as a prerequisite for voting was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.202 The state argued that
since it can demand a fee for a driver's license, it should also be
able to demand a reasonable fee for voting as long as it is uni-
formly applied.0 3 The Court dispensed with this argument with
the terse statement that the interest of a state "when it comes to
voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifications.""
The state contended, in essence, that the poll tax was simply a
way of collecting revenue and was not set so high as to deprive
anyone of the right to vote. There were two defects in this position.
198. Id. at 588 (Clark, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 568.
200. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
201. Id. at 667.
202. See id. at 670.
203. See id. at 668.
204. Id. at 668.
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First, the poll tax revenue was not collected for the purpose of pay-
ing the administrative costs of elections. It instead went to support
public schools or was returned to the counties for general pur-
poses.105 Second, the primary penalty for failure to pay the tax was
denial of the right to vote, not enforcement of the tax as a financial
obligation. °0 The state's argument was weakened by these facts
because the first indicated that a rather arbitrary 07 process existed
for determining the amount of the tax and the second indicated
that the state's primary concern seemed to be the restriction of the
franchise rather than the collection of tax revenue.
In this light it becomes more understandable why the Court, al-
ready suspicious of discrimination in regard to voting after Reyn-
olds, would not believe the state had an adequate reason for re-
stricting the voting rights of those citizens who were unable to pay
the fee. Assuming the legislature gave thought to the matter, the
facts tend to lead to the conclusion that the poll tax was imposed
primarily because of some unspoken preference for those with suf-
ficient resources or, perhaps more accurately, for those to whom
the payment of the tax would be less of an inconvenience. Or, it
might be said that the poll tax appears to have been enacted as a
result of the notion that those who could not or would not pay
$1.50 did not deserve the "privilege" of voting. Since the state's
justification was being "meticulously scrutinized," it had the bur-
den of showing that its action did not arise from such unacceptable
notions, and it failed to carry that burden.
E. Classification in Regard to Access to Justice
In Griffin v. Illinois,20 8 a state law provided the right of appeal
to all defendants convicted in a criminal case. In order to take ad-
vantage of this right a stenographic transcript of the trial proceed-
ings was required.2 0 9 The petitioners, Griffin and Crenshaw, after
having been convicted sought to have a transcript provided them
205. See id. at 664 n.1.
206. See id. at 664 n.1.
207. The process was arbitrary because nothing but the will of those establishing the
tax controlled the amount chosen. If $1.50 could be chosen, so could a larger amount; and
since the amount was not related to the costs of administering elections, no standard existed
by which the set fee could be evaluated.
208. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
209. See id. at 16.
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without cost because they were without funds to pay for it.210 Al-
though the Illinois law allowed a free transcript under some cir-
cumstances, 2 1 it did not provide for one in their case. As the Court
saw the case, these individuals, because they had no money to
purchase a transcript, were denied the right to obtain adequate ap-
pellate review even though the record of their trial might contain
errors that would otherwise require reversal.21" This, the Court
held, violated equal protection.2 18
Justice Black, speaking for the Court, discussed the importance
of the concept of equal justice under which all persons come before
the law to be judged on their guilt or innocence, not on the basis of
their status.2 4 He went on to find that the ability of one to pay an
amount of money in order to obtain adequate appellate review has
no relationship to his guilt or innocence."' Even though due pro-
cess does not require a state to provide a right to appeal in crimi-
nal cases, once it chooses to do so, he reasoned, it cannot deny that
right to some defendants solely because they are poor.2 1 6
In Griffin there was no other reason for denying the petitioners
appellate review since they had not failed to abide by time limits
in seeking review, nor had the Illinois appellate court denied re-
view on the ground their allegations of error were insufficient.
They had been unable to obtain adequate appellate review solely
because they were unable to obtain a transcript, and they were un-
able to obtain the transcript solely because they had no money
with which to pay for it. Assuming the existence of error at trial
has a direct relation to the question of defendant's guilt, one can
conclude that being able to pay for a transcript could become the
crucial factor in determining guilt or innocence in a criminal prose-
cution. Although the Court hesitated to require the state to pay for
transcripts to remedy this unequal treatment, 1 7 it clearly did find
that the state could not justify the inequality by contending that it
210. See id. at 13.
211. See id. at 15 (free transcripts allowed for appeals involving constitutional ques-
tions, but not trial errors such as sufficiency of evidence).
212. See id. at 16.
213. See id. at 19.
214. See id. at 16-17.
215. See id. at 17-18.
216. See id. at 18.
217. See id. at 20.
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was seeking to save money.21 8 The state was not, of course, respon-
sible for anyone's poverty, but it could not discriminate in this
fashion on the basis of one's ability to pay because the financial
ability of a defendant is irrelevant to questions of his guilt or
innocence.
Although today the "poor" have shown that they are not always
a politically powerless minority perhaps, in part because as to cer-
tain issues they may constitute a majority, the more limited class
of indigent, convicted criminals does fit within the powerless cate-
gory. One need only describe the class in these terms to recognize
how a legislature might be prompted to conclude that its members
are not deserving of what might be viewed as "extra" state protec-
tion, that is, the provision of state moneys. It can be argued, there-
fore, that it is the nature of this disfavored class which also justi-
fies the application of judicial scrutiny because it shows how a
legislature might tend arbitrarily to disfavor this group. Judicial
scrutiny is called for not so much because a right to equal justice is
denied but because the facts available in these circumstances pro-
vide support for the conclusion that equal treatment was denied
without good reason.
F. Classification in Regard to Interstate Migration (Based on
Duration of Residence)
The Court's decision in Shapiro v. Thompson2"" held unconsti-
tutional the laws of several states and of the District of Columbia
which withheld welfare benefits from residents until they had re-
sided in that jurisdiction for at least one year.22 0 The separate ap-
peals decided in this case all presented the same basic issue, that
is, whether indigent residents could be denied welfare, even though
they were otherwise qualified, solely because they had not satisfied
a one-year residency requirement.2 2 These challenges were
brought by persons who for various reasons had moved to or re-
turned to jurisdictions imposing this requirement. In one case a
teenage unwed mother who was pregnant moved to Connecticut to
live with her mother and was forced to apply for welfare when her
218. Cf. id. at 17-18.
219. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
220. See id. at 622-27.
221. See id. at 627.
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mother became unable to support her. Being pregnant, she was un-
able to work or enter a job training program.2 2 In another case a
mother, suffering from cancer, had moved with her three children
to Washington to be near members of her family.2" Another appel-
lee had upon her return to the District of Columbia been commit-
ted to a mental hospital and though eligible for release to a foster
home could not be transferred because her transfer depended on
welfare payments for the foster home care.2 In another case an
appellee and her five minor children had moved to Pennsylvania to
live with her father but was forced to apply for welfare when he
lost his job."'
The Court found that the one-year residency requirement cre-
ated two classes of needy resident families which were indistin-
guishable except that the disfavored class consisted of members
who had not resided in the respective jurisdictions for one year
prior to application.22" The states and the District of Columbia
presented a variety of justifications for this distinction. In one cat-
egory were the governmental interests which the Court found to be
totally unacceptable as justifications for the one-year residency re-
quirement. In the other category were those interests the states
claimed were promoted by the one-year requirement, which al-
though legitimate were not accepted because the Court did not be-
lieve they actually prompted the enactment of the one-year
requirement.
In the first category were the arguments that the requirement
deterred migration into the states by indigents and thereby pro-
tected the funds available to assist long-term residents, 7 discour-
aged migration by those indigents who would otherwise flock to
states with higher benefits,"'2 and generally operated to preserve
benefits for long-term residents to compensate them for their past
tax contributions to the community.22' The Court found the evi-
dence indicated that the most likely reason for the one-year resi-
222. See id. at 623.
223. See id. at 624.
224. See id. at 624.
225. See id. at 626.
226. See id. at 627.
227. See id. at 627-28.
228. See id. at 631.
229. See id. at 632.
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dence requirement was to keep indigents from moving into the
states' 80 and concluded that the requirement was well suited to ac-
complish that end.23 1 Achieving this purpose through discrimina-
tion which operated to deprive new residents of welfare benefits
was, however, deemed constitutionally unacceptable because it
conflicted with the right to travel, which the Court found was im-
plicitly protected by other constitutional provisions.3 As the
Court saw it, a state could not justify unequal treatment of simi-
larly situated persons by attempting to pursue an end which is in-
consistent with constitutional protections independent of equal
protection.2
The Court found the second argument, deterrence of those who
might migrate for higher benefits, based on a nonrebuttable pre-
sumption that all who apply in their first year of residence had
come to that jurisdiction solely to obtain higher benefits.2 " This
presumption was totally devoid of any factual basis in the cases
before the Court 2" and, more importantly, was necessarily based
on the assumption that those who enter a state for this reason are
unworthy of welfare assistance.2" The Court also found unaccept-
able the state's purpose of rewarding long-term residents for their
past tax contributions.2 87 Even overlooking defects in this argu-
ment as applied to this case, such as the past residence in those
states by some of the plaintiffs, the Court was unable to accept this
justification because to do so would be to accept the proposition
that every governmental benefit or service could be apportioned
according to tax contributions.2 8 This would mean a state could
openly provide the best education, police protection, or fire protec-
tion to the wealthy or to those who had because of long-term resi-
dence paid larger amounts in taxes while providing these services
in reduced degrees to new residents or the less wealthy.
230. See id. at 628.
231. See id. at 629.
232. See id. at 629-31.
233. See id. at 631.
234. See id. at 631.
235. See id. at 631.
236. See id. at 631-32. The Court found no real difference between moving to a state to
obtain higher welfare benefits and moving to a state to enjoy its better educational or other
governmental benefits. See id. at 632.
237. See id. at 632.
238. See id. at 632-33.
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Behind all these arguments was the interest in saving money or
protecting the fiscal integrity of those programs a state had estab-
lished. Although this is a legitimate concern, the Court concluded
that the states may not accomplish this purpose by making invidi-
ous-that is, unjustifiable distinctions-between otherwise simi-
larly qualified classes of its citizens.2 9 The effort to save money
does not explain why the states chose to do so at the expense of a
class of indigent residents whose members had not resided one
year in the state. In the other category were proffered justifications
based on the state's alleged attempts to facilitate fiscal planning,
provide an objective test for residence, minimize the opportunity
for welfare fraud, and encourage early entry into the work force.2 40
In considering the evidence the Court was not convinced that these
reasons played any part in the enactment of the one-year
requirement.2 4
1
The Court said that since the states and the District of Colum-
bia had classified in regard to the fundamental right of interstate
travel or migration, the classification was to be judged under a
stricter standard so that the states must show the unequal treat-
ment promoted a compelling state interest.2 42 That burden could
not be carried because they were unable to convince the Court that
anything other than the direct discriminatory effect of this require-
ment was intended. Long-term residents were given benefits and
new arrivals were not primarily because the legislatures believed
new residents did not yet deserve state welfare payments.
In Zobel v. Williams243 the Court held that an Alaskan scheme
for distributing that government's windfall oil revenues to its adult
citizens, based on the length of residence in Alaska, was a violation
of equal protection.4 Although Justice O'Connor concurred in the
judgment on another ground, 43 Justice Rehnquist was the lone
dissenter, criticizing the Court for citing right-to-travel cases be-
cause those involved state laws which impeded the ability to mi-
239. See id. at 633.
240. See id. at 633-34.
241. See id. at 634-38.
242. See id. at 638.
243. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 72 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1982).
244. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2310, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 675.
245. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2322, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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grate to those states.246 The Alaskan plan would hardly deter any-
one from moving to Alaska since new arrivals would be rewarded
for establishing that residence.24 Joined by Justice Stevens, Chief
Justice Burger determined, however, that the law did not even
pass the minimum rationality test.248 In other words, the state
could not show that its discrimination on the basis of length of
residence was rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.
Justice Brennan, writing for three other members of the Court,
placed emphasis on the essence of the fundamental interest in hav-
ing the freedom to travel which, he reasoned, arose from the con-
cept of equal citizenship.2 49 The substance of this concept is drawn
from "the ideal of equal protection [which] requires attention" to
current individual needs because these are the only relevant char-
acteristics for determining the legitimacy of discriminations be-
tween persons.25 He viewed discrimination on the basis of a past
event, such as when one moved to the state, as contrary to this
concept and, as well, contrary to the Citizenship Clause of the
fourteenth amendment.2 51 In short, because any discrimination in
regard to duration of residence is invariably based on the "un-
stated premise that 'some citizens are more equal than others,'"
equal protection must prohibit this type of discrimination.2 5
It is difficult to disagree with Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that
Alaska did not negatively affect migration to that state. If the
Alaskan grant of funds to new residents had any effect, it would be
to encourage the residents of other states to move there. Also, the
rational basis test applied by Chief Justice Burger has traditionally
called for little or no judicial scrutiny and operates with a pre-
sumption of constitutionality which requires a challenger to carry
the burden of showing that no possible justification for the chal-
lenged inequality could exist. Under this approach actual justifica-
246. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2324-25, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 691-93 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
247. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2324, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 692 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
248. See id. at ,102 S. Ct. at 2315, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 681.
249. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2316-18, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 681-85 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
250. See id. at , 102 S. Ct. at 2318, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 684 (Brennan, J., concurring).
251. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2318, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 684-85 (Brennan, J., concurring).
252. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2318, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tion is rarely needed by the state.
Justice Brennan in his opinion stated that "those instances in
which length of residence could provide a legitimate basis for dis-
tinguishing one citizen from another are rare. ' 253 This is because,
he explained, the length of one's residence "has only the most ten-
uous relation to the actual service of individuals to the State."28 4
Viewed in a different way, this opinion indicates that Justice Bren-
nan and three other Justices did not believe the Alaska legislature
had been motivated to make this distinction because of the belief
that the longer one had resided in Alaska, the greater the contribu-
tions to the state. As he saw it, "resort to duration of residence as
the basis for a distribution of state largesse does closely track the
constitutionally untenable position that the longer one's residence,
the worthier one is of the State's favor.
255
Again it can be seen that it is not so much interference with the
right to travel which prompts judicial scrutiny. It is, instead, a re-
alization of the likelihood that unequal treatment of new residents
is so often the result of an arbitrary decision which causes the
Court to be suspicious of such classifications. This suspicion is jus-
tified because the political and, in this case, the financial self-inter-
est of elected officials is well served by preferring established resi-
dents who will constitute the overwhelming majority of the voting
populace and will invariably control all elements of power and in-
fluence in the state. New residents will be, as a class, politically
and otherwise powerless to protect themselves against the biased
actions of a legislature. In effect, elected officials will have great
incentive to favor established residents and no reason to fear the
reaction of new residents when they do so.
G. Quasi-Suspect and Quasi-Fundamental Interests
Although the Court in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez2" appeared to have set itself firmly against the
identification of any new fundamental interests in equal protection
analysis while holding that the right to equal provision of educa-
253. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2318, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 684 (Brennan, J., concurring).
254. See id. at , 102 S. Ct. at 2318, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 684 (Brennan, J., concurring).
255. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2318, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring).
256. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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tional services was not such an interest, 2 5 a majority of the Court
in the recent case of Plyler v. Doe258 accepted the argument that
when a state discriminates against the school age children of illegal
aliens by preventing their enjoyment of a free public education, at
least heightened scrutiny must be applied. e In Plyler, two Jus-
tices concurred stressing the importance of the interest affected
but did not call for the strict scrutiny which would be prompted by
the identification of education as a fundamental interest.2 6 0 Chief
Justice Burger, in his dissent, characterized this mixed approach as
one in which a quasi-suspect class and a quasi-fundamental inter-
est were combined in order to require intensified scrutiny.26 1
Justice Brennan, writing the opinion of the Court, agreed that
education was not a fundamental interest and also conceded that
undocumented aliens could not be considered a suspect class be-
cause their illegal residence could well be relevant to the achieve-
ment of legitimate governmental objectives. "2 The Court, there-
fore, could not presume that a distinction made on the basis of
legality of an alien's residence was irrational and arbitrary. Justice
Brennan did insist, however, that a state must be furthering some
"substantial goal" before it could constitutionally deprive the
school age children of undocumented aliens, who could not be held
responsible for their illegal status, of such an important interest.2"
In a footnote he explained what had prompted the Court to treat
certain classifications as suspect.
Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-
seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of
some legitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice
is easily recognized as incompatible with the constitutional under-
standing that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled
to equal justice under the law. Classifications treated as suspect
tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal .... Legislation
257. See id. at 35-38. The Court stated that before an interest could be deemed funda-
mental for equal protection purposes it must be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in some
other provision of the Constitution. See id. at 33-34.
258. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982).
259. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2402, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 808.
260. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2404, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 810 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2406, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 813 (Powell, J., concurring).
261. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2409, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 817 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
262. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2398, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 803.
263. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2398, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 803.
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imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of cir-
cumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of "class or
caste" treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
abolish."'
Also, when a legislature denies a benefit to or imposes a burden on
a class because of characteristics or circumstances over which the
members have no control, it will often be acting in an irrational
manner. If we assume government grants a benefit for the ultimate
purpose of either encouraging the action rewarded or providing for
those unable to provide for themselves, denial of the benefit to one
because of some circumstance over which that person has no con-
trol appears incongruous and contradictory. Moreover, a legal bur-
den is usually imposed to deter certain action, so why would a ra-
tional person seek to penalize someone because of a circumstance
which that person cannot affect? In this light the Court was justifi-
ably suspicious when Texas decided to penalize school age children
because their parents had illegally entered the United States. '
The majority of the Court in Plyler, including the concurring
Justices, emphasized the importance of education as a way to es-
cape poverty or other disabilities of lower class status." State de-
nial of welfare for the support of the dependent children of illegal
aliens would, apparently, not require justification by the state.
Even if the absence of an interest with the "class mobility" impor-
tance of education were not a sufficient distinction, it might be ar-
gued that such benefits are paid to parents, who would not be in-
nocent of their illegal status, to assist them in supporting their
families. There are, however, other benefits which would be more
directly denied the minor children of undocumented aliens, such as
free nonemergency medical care. These minor children, innocent of
any responsibility for their illegal status, would be similarly situ-
ated in all relevant qualifications with legal, indigent residents re-
quiring such care. Under these circumstances the Court might well
conclude, using the reasoning of Justice Brennan, that the state
should come forward to justify its unequal treatment. On the other
264. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2394 n.14, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 799 n.14.
265. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2396, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 801.
266. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2398, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 803; id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2404,
72 L. Ed. 2d at 810 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2406, 72 L. Ed. 2d at
813 (Powell, J., concurring).
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hand, the Court could choose to go no further than Plyler, which is
grounded in part on the serious effect of deprivation of education.
An interest is, however, important only in regard to some purpose
or end; and although education can be seen as necessary to class
mobility, so can job training or relief from debilitating physical ail-
ments or relief from starvation.21 7 In short, even with the educa-
tion emphasis in Plyler the Court could logically move to strike
other laws which directly deprive the minor children of illegal
aliens of sorely needed public support. This is because in the un-
derlying logic of equal protection deprivations of this class of peo-
ple is not likely to be based on a rational decision but instead de-
rived from broad, unsubstantiated, and unjustified assumptions as
to the worthiness of these children for state aid.
V. THEORY
To discover the obscure message in the equal protection opinions
written by the Supreme Court over more than a century requires
one to examine the language of those opinions in a different light
and to theorize as to the possible meanings of that language. The
reader of such an attempt must wonder why those Justices did not
clearly articulate their message if it was intended. There is no sim-
ple answer to this question, but there are reasons for the obscurity.
The Supreme Court labors under a dual obligation in deciding
cases brought before it. First, the Court must decide issues which
can be described as very difficult. Those cases that can be ade-
quately decided by the mechanical application of precedent rarely
reach the Court unless the challenge is to the existing law itself. In
a sense, therefore, issues come before the Court precisely because
they require policy decisions and because that exercise of judgment
is required of the final arbiter of constitutional law. Second, the
Supreme Court decides cases through stated reasoning in opinions.
These opinions provide a basis for criticizing the decision and for
predicting the outcome of future cases. In anticipation of criticism
the Court often strains to align its decision with the original intent
of the framers while dealing with questions that were never consid-
ered by them." 8 In using the Court's opinions as precedent there is
267. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).




always the tendency to simplify intricate reasoning so as to derive
a shorthand statement of a manageable rule. The need for simplifi-
cation thus operates to obscure further that which the Justices
may have only glimpsed dimly or may have feared to explain
openly. In addition, the cases show that the "meaning" of the
Equal Protection Clause has never been static; it is the ever-chang-
ing product of elaborations necessitated by the variety of circum-
stances to which equal protection has been applied.2 '
As a result of all this, any attempt to create an answer for the
conundrum of equal protection requires both the writer and the
reader to use their imaginative faculties. It is often said that imagi-
nation is not the strong suit of lawyers, but then what other pro-
fession could have held so stolidly to a separate-but-equal concep-
tion for over fifty years while living in the maw of such
depressingly real contradictions. Imagination is but an intellectual
tool; it was used by the Supreme Court to construct a fiction in
Plessy and to dismantle it in Brown. In this article imagination is
used to allow one to walk away from the commands of established
doctrine and return from a different direction to the questions of
what is equal protection law and should it be so.
A different perspective is also necessary for judging the legiti-
macy of the Supreme Court's use of its interpretive discretion.
This society should be concerned about the control it has over gov-
ernment; but, the need for control over the Supreme Court cannot
be weighed without also asking what society wants from the Court.
Do we, for instance, wish to create a "super-bureaucracy" for fear
of a "super-legislature"? "Activism" does not tell us much of the
humane forces which often seem to prompt decisions; it does, how-
ever, tell us of the critic's stand on the abstract institutional issue
raised. There is more to the Constitution and the Supreme Court's
use of it, however, than is captured in buzz-words or the state-
ments of legal rules and philosophies. Justice is not done solely
through rules; it is done by persons who possess authority and a
strong sense of the fair application of rules. Anyone who has
sought to correct the error of a computer through correspondence
with that machine can realize how strict adherence to rigid rules
sometimes sacrifices fairness. Before, therefore, we judge the
Court, we should examine how it has attempted to do justice
269. Cf. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1068 (1981).
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through the Equal Protection Clause.
The opinions of the Court in the foregoing cases evidence one
primary decision which is, one must admit, not openly stated. Sim-
ply put, this is the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause as a prohibition of arbitrary governmental dif-
ferentiation between people in the imposition of burdens or in the
provision of benefits. Even though in the fundamental-interest
cases the Court tends to speak of an individual's right to vote, to
travel, or to have access to justice, equal protection decisions in
general can only be explained, as a first step, by recognizing the
Court's constant concern for the arbitrariness of the motives for
challenged governmental classifications. The implications of this
interpretation are moderated by the Court's further realization
that every governmental classification cannot be scrutinized for ar-
bitrariness. This is evidenced by the use of judicial scrutiny only
once a particular type of classification has been identified as sus-
pect or suspicious. Few would doubt, considering the realities of
the legislative process, that in far more instances than those identi-
fied by the Court lawmakers are motivated by self-interest, bias, or
other questionable concerns. Unless, however, a classification is
one of those lifted out of the lowest tier, the Court gives such def-
erence to the legislature that no reason need be given for its deci-
sion. In consequence, these nonsuspicious classifications are be-
yond equal protection in the sense that the legislature has the
power to use them at will.27 0
To make constitutional law in light of its interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause while recognizing the impossibility of im-
mediately transforming this absolute into effective law, the Court
has used what can be described as a two-step evidentiary process.
The first step involves deciding when a court should scrutinize the
government's justification for a classification, and the second step
involves the application of that scrutiny.
The first step is reflected in the Court's identification of a classi-
fication as suspect or at least suspicious. A truly suspect classifica-
tion faces the strongest presumption of unconstitutionality pre-
cisely because the Court cannot conceive of a legitimate use for
270. Cf. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1,
8 (1972); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1087 (1969).
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such a classification. 17 1 It is given the strictest scrutiny in the sense
that the Court confronts such a classification with the certain
knowledge that it was the result of prejudice or some other arbi-
trary motive. Suspicious classifications are scrutinized because of
the probability that they are arbitrary but are not given the strict-
est scrutiny because factual differences do exist which might con-
ceivably justify different treatment. For example, physical differ-
ences between males and females may justify different treatment
of the sexes when the state seeks to regulate teenage pregnancy72
Most often, however, distinctions made because of gender have
sprung from assumptions as to the role or place of men and women
in society and not from thoughtful consideration of factual
evidence.
The common element of the cases declaring the need for some
degree of scrutiny is the existence of evidence drawn from history,
judicial experience, and the face of the statute or its practical oper-
ation to prove that the type of classification is one which by its
very nature is not likely to have been enacted because of a
thoughtful consideration of the relevant qualifications of members
of the disfavored class. For instance, the Court has found suspi-
cious the denial of the ability to freely socialize or to enter and
enjoy public facilities because of darker skin pigmentation, '7 the
denial of administrator status because of the absence of a penis
and the possession of a womb, 2 7 and the denial of equivalent legis-
lative representation in a representative democracy because one
has an address in an urban rather than a rural area.2 76 Further evi-
dence of the likelihood of arbitrariness is provided by the political
powerlessness of the disfavored class since, recognizing political re-
alities, one can assume that officials will allow their prejudices free
rein or at least take less care whenever those who will bear the
burden of their action can do little about it. An elected official
271. As Justice Stewart has stated, "detrimental racial classifications by government
always violate the Constitution, for the simple reason that, so far as the Constitution is
concerned, people of different races are always similarly situated." Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring).
272. See id. at 471-73.
273. See Mississippi Univ. For Women v. Hogan, - U.S .... 102 S. Ct. 3331,
3336-37 nn.10-11, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 1098-99 nn.10-11 (1982).
274. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
275. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
276. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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need not be fearful at election time if he or she has victimized ille-
gal alien children,277 convicted criminals, 78 or new residents when
benefits have thereby been provided or preserved for law-abiding
citizens or long-term residents.279
Once sufficient reason for suspicion is held to exist, the Court
calls for judicial examination thereafter of that type of classifica-
tion to discover in each case whether the government has in fact
acted arbitrarily. Although the statement of the test to be applied
once a classification is thus placed under judicial scrutiny varies,
the government at a minimum must prove to a court's satisfaction
that the primary motivation for the making of the challenged clas-
sification was not an arbitrary one. Although the Supreme Court
speaks of the affirmative obligation of showing sufficient relation-
ship to an important and legitimate governmental end, these adjec-
tives alone provide no aid in presenting an equal protection case or
predicting its outcome. If, however, these terms are viewed in rela-
tion to the Court's search for arbitrariness, one must conclude that
when the Court determines that a classification is sufficiently re-
lated to a legitimate end, it is concluding that the classification was
not the result of arbitrary decisionmaking. Restated, the govern-
ment's burden is to prove that the primary motivation for the en-
actment of a suspect or suspicious classification cannot be de-
scribed as arbitrary while the challenger seeks to prove that it
should be so described.
The Court has, however, stated that it is a "familiar principle of
constitutional law that [it] will not strike down an otherwise con-
stitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative mo-
tive."2 80 One reason for this principle is that a legislature consists
of a variety individuals driven by different impulses, and the Court
cannot be assured that the speeches of a few found in a legislative
history represent the thoughts of a majority.281 Moreover, inquiry
into motive smacks of psychoanalysis which as a process of analy-
sis is unlikely to be judicially manageable. Furthermore, inquiry
277. See Plyler v. Doe, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982).
278. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
279. See Zobel v. Williams, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 72 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1982); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
280. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
281. See id. at 384.
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into the subjective motive of legislators can only be accomplished
by looking to what they said in debates or speeches pertaining to a
law's enactment. If the Court used these statements as significant
factors in determining constitutionality, free and open legislative
debate might be chilled. Finally, to determine motivation a court
might even be required to call legislators to testify as to personal
and legislative motives.28
Recently, however, the Court has established the requirement of
a showing of intentional or purposeful discrimination as a prereq-
uisite for an equal protection violation.283 This requirement is im-
posed whenever a statute challenged as being discriminatory in re-
gard to some suspect or suspicious basis does not discriminate on
its face but has effects which turn on that basis. 24 Under these
circumstances, the challenger must begin by submitting proof that
the government was "motivated in part by a . ..discriminatory
purpose. 28 5 If the challenger succeeds, the burden shifts to the
government to prove that the statute would have been enacted
"even had the impermissible purpose not been considered. 28 6 The
prima facie showing of "a discriminatory motivation" can be over-
come, therefore, by the government's showing that the dominant or
primary motivation, that which was most responsible for the enact-
ment, was nondiscriminatory. In effect, the challenger must prove
that the legislature "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its ad-
verse effects upon an identifiable group." 287
Satisfying the showing of discriminatory intent or purpose ap-
pears at first glance only to bring the case to the point at which the
Court would have begun if the particular type of discrimination
alleged had been apparent on the face of the statute. This appear-
282. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 215 (1962). But see Village of Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977).
283. See Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. -, -, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3276-77, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1012,
1018-19 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980); Personnel Adm'r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
284. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
285. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270 n.21 (1977).
286. See id. at 270 n.21; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
287. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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ance is deceiving, however, because the analysis leading up to the
conclusion that discriminatory intent existed must include consid-
eration of the purported nondiscriminatory purpose of the chal-
lenged statute. 88 In other words, if discriminatory intent is estab-
lished, nothing remains to be done because the usual analysis given
the alleged legitimate, nondiscriminatory purposes has already
been completed. Once discriminatory intent is shown in regard to a
basis previously determined by the Court to be suspect or suspi-
cious, nothing can remain because this proof has established that
the government was predominantly motivated by the wish to dis-
criminate on that basis. If a statute discriminates on its face in
regard to a suspect or suspicious basis, the challenger is saved from
his obligation of proving discriminatory motive and the govern-
ment must begin by proving that the primary motive was
nondiscriminatory.
The Court's concern for using motive is, in reality, a concern for
the type of evidence needed in this regard. In Rogers v. Lodge289 a
lower federal court had used various patterns of local governmen-
tal discrimination to prove that an at-large voting system was
maintained because of purposeful racial discrimination; the Su-
preme Court affirmed this holding because it was not clearly erro-
neous.2 90 Justice Powell in his dissent contended that the Court
was thereby inviting the federal courts "to engage in deeply subjec-
tive inquiries into the motivations of local officials ... 1 Jus
tice Stevens likewise criticized the Court in Rogers for using a
"subjective approach" to determine the motivations behind chal-
lenged governmental action.29
It is clear that discriminatory effects alone are not sufficient.
"Discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. ' '25 As can be seen, the constitu-
288. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270 n.21 (1977). In the Feeney case the Court held that the challengers had failed to
show intentional discrimination on the basis of gender because, considering the "totality of
legislative actions," the challenged veterans' preference law was intended simply to prefer
veterans over nonveterans, which is not a suspicious classification, rather than men over
women. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280 (1979).
289. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1982).
290. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3279-81, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1022-24.
291. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3282, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1026 (Powell, J., dissenting).
292. See id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3286, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1030 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
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tional fact which is ultimately determinative is not simply intent
since "normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural
consequences of his deeds,""' yet a statute is unconstitutional only
when the legislature took action 'because of,' not merely 'in spite
of,' its adverse effects .... ,129 To take action "because of" dis-
criminatory effects means the legislature was primarily motivated
by the desire to accomplish those ends. Determining the primary
motivation for a legislative enactment can be accomplished with-
out psychoanalysis of the legislature by presuming that body in-
tended to achieve the foreseeable effects of its enactment and by
asking what type of thought process would most likely underlie
this action. Assuming the legislature is effective in doing what it
decides to do in enacting a statute, what sort of decision is most
strongly evidenced by the challenged provision? When there exists
credible evidence in the legislative history relevant to this issue, it
should be used but should not be determinative. The reason is
that, as previously noted, this evidence can never be conclusive.
To derail this logic the government must successfully argue that
even though its statute discriminates, on its face, in regard to a
presumedly arbitrary basis, a different, nondiscriminatory end was
intended; therefore, the discriminatory motive was not the moving
force behind that enactment. To do so the government must prove
that the statute can be reasonably said to accomplish that legiti-
mate end so that the Court is convinced that this was why the
government acted as it did. When the challenged statute is not dis-
criminatory on its face, the burden is on the challenger to prove
that the primary motivation was the desire to cause the foreseeable
discriminatory impact of the law. This burden cannot be carried
solely by proving discriminatory impact;21" but if, in addition, a
clear pattern of action unexplainable on other grounds exists or
the sequence of events leading up to the challenged action shows
the intent to discriminate, 2 a court can conclude that the primary
motive was to discriminate on a suspect or suspicious basis. If so,
the statute falls because this basis has already been identified as
264-65 (1977).
294. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
295. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
296. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977).
297. See id. at 266-67.
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one presumed to be the result of arbitrary decisionmaking and be-
cause the purported justifications have already been deemed irrele-
vant in the process.
"Arbitrary" discrimination is that which is motivated primarily
by the whim, will, or caprice of the decisionmaker. On the other
end of the spectrum are those enactments which, though they in-
clude classifications, spring from a thoughtful consideration of the
merits or abilities of individuals. The absence of a precise line be-
tween permissible and impermissible inequality is inherent in the
nature of the Court's interpretation, and the Court must imple-
ment this reading in the context of a variety of circumstances and
in the face of often subtle attempts to promote the prejudices of
officials. The Court does not, however, confront the question of ar-
bitrariness as an open issue in each case. It first considers the type
of classification abstracted from the particular facts of a case to
determine if in light of history, experience, and the nature of the
classification and the classes, there exists a sufficient probability of
arbitrariness to consider the classification inherently suspicious or
suspect. If so, then it turns to the facts of the particular case plac-
ing the burden on the government of proving nonarbitrariness to
the Court's satisfaction. What the Court usually finds as arbitrary
is that discrimination which ultimately springs from unexamined
assumptions by officials as to the relative, general worth of the fa-
vored and disfavored classes. Such an assumption is evidenced by
the willingness of government to punish or deprive a large number
of individuals regardless of their responsibility or guilt because of a
shared characteristic which alone has no apparent relevance to the
government's purported end. It is also evidenced by an unwilling-
ness to deprive those who should be affected if the government has
a legitimate concern but who do not share the characteristic upon
which the classification is based. Overinclusiveness and underinclu-
siveness support the conclusion that government acted primarily
because of preconceived notions or biases.
It was this sort of decisionmaking which characterized the ine-
qualities that plagued blacks before the fourteenth amendment be-
came part of the Constitution. The Court has drawn from that ex-
perience the essential danger of inequality caused by government
and construed it to be the heart of the prohibition contained in the
Equal Protection Clause. This construction can therefore be justi-
fied in history and by reference to the fundamental principle that
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in a society in which the people are the ultimate sovereign, officials
are not authorized to govern arbitrarily.
After establishing the presumption of arbitrariness, the Court
usually begins its examination of a particular case by evaluating
the similar situation of the favored and disfavored classes in regard
to the burden or benefit created by the provision to which the clas-
sification relates. Emphasis is placed on those characteristics,
shared by these classes, which would ordinarily be defined as quali-
fications for the burden or benefit. To the extent the classes share
these qualifications one would naturally question the different
treatment. Determining what are the qualifications for a benefit or
burden is the Court's way of identifying those factual characteris-
tics which a rational legislature would have considered significant
in making its decision. As the Court finds greater commonality of
qualifications the legislative decision to treat such similar classes
differently becomes nothing more than a decision to discriminate
on the challenged basis. Considering that this similar situation
analysis invariably follows a determination that classifications
made on the challenged basis are suspicious because they are un-
likely to be rationally related to any legitimate governmental pur-
pose, the realization that the primary end was to establish such a
classification for its own sake is tantamount to the conclusion that
the government acted arbitrarily.
Moreover, whenever examination of proffered justifications leads
to the realization that government enacted a suspicious classifica-
tion without any independent purpose, a court can reasonably in-
fer that government was motivated by an unexamined assumption
as to the relative general worthiness of the favored and disfavored
classes. Action on this basis is arbitrary because it is totally di-
vorced from a rational consideration of individual needs or merits.
The legislature has, in essence, acted on the basis of what it thinks
of the respective classes in the abstract rather than on the basis of
fact. In other words, the government would have acted to treat
people unequally as a matter of its own whim or will. This sort of
action is expected of absolute monarchs, but the Court has deter-
mined under equal protection that at least ideally people in this
society should not be treated unequally when this action results
from a substantial disregard of relevant facts.
The judicial examination of an equal protection issue, therefore,
revolves around the attempt to determine what purpose indepen-
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dent of the intent to discriminate is served by a challenged law.
This "legitimate" purpose must, at a minimum, be framed so that
it can serve to explain why the legislature chose to victimize the
disfavored class in order to achieve its end. It is not, for example,
sufficient to argue that the state sought to save money because this
leaves unexplained the choice of a particular class to bear the bur-
den of this endeavor. Whether the alleged purpose is "important"
or "compelling" seems in the cases to be a question answered with-
out any discernable reference point. The significance of these ad-
jectives cannot be adequately understood except in the context of
the overall analysis of an equal protection issue. The Court will not
reevaluate the legislature's factual basis to determine whether it
can find a more reasonable alternative."98 The degree of impor-
tance required of a purported governmental purpose is, instead, di-
rectly related to the degree of persuasiveness required of the gov-
ernment in overcoming the presumption of arbitrariness that has
been attached to a challenged classification. In other words, these
adjectives do not describe purported governmental purposes as
much as they describe the weight of evidence required to persuade
the Court that the government did, in good faith, attempt to act on
a factual rather than an arbitrary basis. When the strictest scru-
tiny is applied, the state must be able to show that it was forced or
compelled to discriminate as it did.2" Likewise, an important gov-
ernmental end or purpose is one which provides sufficient evidence
to justify the inference that the legislature was moved by it in spite
of the discriminatory nature of the means.
298. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274 (1978).
299. In the Korematsu case the Supreme Court in a rare decision upheld a classifica-
tion based on race. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). While stating that all
legal restrictions of the "civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect," the
Court upheld the conviction of an American citizen of Japanese descent for remaining in an
area in California from which all of Japanese descent had been excluded by an authorized
military order. See id. at 216. In justification of its decision, the Court stated the following:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real mili-
tary dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not
excluded from the military area because of hostility to him or his race. He was ex-
cluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly consti-
tuted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained
to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency. ..
demanded [the exclusion] . . . . We cannot-by availing ourselves of the calm per-




In summary, the first stage in the Supreme Court's analysis of
equal protection issues is to determine whether evidence or experi-
ence shows that by its very nature the type of classification chal-
lenged is likely to have been enacted because of arbitrary decision-
making. If the court finds sufficient evidence to be suspicious, the
presumption of arbitrariness is attached and must be rebutted by
the government. The next step involves consideration of the prof-
fered legitimate purposes of the- classification. When a challenged
statute is discriminatory on its face, these purposes must be
framed in terms of an indirect effect or objective of the classifica-
tion; and the government must show that under the circumstances
it was truly moved by the need to use the discriminatory means to
achieve that end.
VI. JUSTIFICATION
This description of the underlying logic of equal protection deci-
sions not only indicates the reason this area of law defies explana-
tion by reference to simple standards but also points up the discre-
tion the Court has assumed in making equal protection law. The
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as a prohibition of
arbitrary discrimination has far-reaching implications in that it
opens the way for increased limitation of the government's power
to classify, or, more precisely, it suggests that in the future further
judicial control of the manner in which government makes these
decisions is to be expected.
The most persistent criticism of the Supreme Court's expansion
in constitutional protection of individual liberties is the claim that
this expansion represents nothing less than an assumption of
power by the judiciary that was never intended and, therefore, is
an usurpation of power reserved to the electorally-accountable
branches of government, federal and state.300 The judicial power to
interpret the Constitution and apply it as law is not the focus of
this criticism: it is the manner by which the Court exercises its
discretion in determining the constitutional protection for individ-
uals against governmental regulation. Chief Justice Burger in his
dissent to the decision in Plyler criticized the majority for employ-
300. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TuNT AMENDMENT 351-52, 362 (1977).
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ing the fourteenth amendment so as to become an "omnipotent
and omniscient problem solver" which strikes down laws that do
not meet its "standards of desirable social policy." 30 1 Justice Rehn-
quist has also criticized those on the Court who would read into
the general words of the Equal Protection Clause their own values
and policy decisions. 02 These criticisms gain special force when
one recognizes that the Justices of the Supreme Court are ap-
pointed, not elected, and serve until they either die, resign, or are
convicted after impeachment.30 8 To this degree of independence, it
is argued, we should not also add the power to declare the supreme
law of the land unrestricted by the requirement that the Court re-
fer to some value choice made by the framers. The spectre which
arises from these points pictures judicial dictators who like
Orwell's proverbial pigs in Animal Farm rewrite the Constitution
daily as they see fit.
To make judicial review by the Court "legitimate," commenta-
tors have made various suggestions. The most radical change is
proposed by Raoul Berger who contends that the Court should be
restricted in the exercise of judicial review to the specific meaning
intended by the framers.30 The dominant value of this suggestion
is that, if imposed on the Court, it would limit the Court's power
to interpret the Equal Protection Clause broadly and thereby leave
greater power to those governmental officials who are more
electorally-accountable. 80 5 No one would seriously argue that there
301. See Plyler v. Doe, - U.S. -, -, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2408, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 816
(1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
302. He found the Court's expansive reading of the Equal Protection Clause to be an
unjustified intrusion into areas under legislative control.
[M]ore than a century of decisions. . . have. . . produced a syndrome wherein this
Court seems to regard the Equal Protection Clause as a cat-o'-nine-tails to be kept in
the judicial closet as a threat to legislatures which may, in the view of the judiciary,
get out of hand and pass "arbitrary," "illogical," or "unreasonable" laws. Except in
the area of the law in which the Framers obviously meant it to apply-classifications
based on race or on national origin, the first cousin of race-the Court's decisions can
fairly be described as an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a series of con-
clusions unsupported by any central guiding principle.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
303. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
304. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 407-09 (1977).
305. "Electorally-accountable" is a term borrowed from Michael J. Perry. See M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (1982).
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should be no concern for possible abuses of the power of judicial
review as exercised by the Supreme Court or that there is no value
in having decisions made by representative bodies of government.
The point is, however, that the Supreme Court is not beyond con-
trol even though its members are not elected or appointed for defi-
nite terms; furthermore, there are distinct values to society in al-
lowing the Court to exercise interpretive discretion as it has.
As Alexander Bickel stated, "[T]o say that the Supreme Court
lays down the law of the land is to state the ultimate result. '30'
The Court does, of course, have power to affect directly the liti-
gants in the case before it; but to make its declarations of constitu-
tional law effective in all like situations, it must depend largely on
the consent of those affected or on the enforcement powers of the
other branches of the federal government. 07 When the persons to
whom a constitutional mandate is directed refuse to obey it, the
Court by itself possesses no brute power by which obedience can
be coerced. For its statement of law to have broad practical effect
in society, the Court must depend on the willingness of the elected
officials in the federal legislature to use their powers to appropriate
funds for long-term enforcement efforts or of the President to
muster forces to immediately coerce obedience by recalcitrants.3 0e
One need only consider the inability of the Court to effect broad
based change by its own decision in the area of school segregation
to realize that the Court lacks the essential power of a dictator,
that is, the ability to bludgeon the populace into compliance with
its dictates. 0'
In addition to this inherent limitation are other controls which
spring from what we know as the system of checks and balances
that operates between the branches of the federal government.
First, Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate.3 10 Since 1869 on
306. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1978).
307. See id. at 91.94.
308. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
309. Cf. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 92 (1978).
310. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Lawrence Tribe suggests that this process is "entirely
political, and [that] the sometimes quite rapid turnover in the Supreme Court's membership
suggests that the federal judiciary may be more capable of adapting to changes in the politi-
cal consensus" than one might expect. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-6,
at 50 (1978).
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the average approximately three Justices have been appointed by
each President. 1 Since 1930 there is a close correlation between
the percentage of time one of the major political parties held the
White House and the percentage of Justices appointed. 12 This in-
dicates that a President, who perhaps more than any other elected
official can speak for the country's majority, has substantial power
to appoint Justices who share his philosophy.
The President cannot, of course, control a Justice after appoint-
ment, but the Congress has power to restrict the Court's appellate
jurisdiction1 ' and to determine the number of Justices who will
constitute the Court. s ' The power to regulate the Court's appel-
late jurisdiction is not unlimited in that that at some point partic-
ularized withdrawal of jurisdiction from the Court would be be-
yond Congress's power.3 15 Also, Congress cannot cancel the term of
a member of the Court after his or her apointment in order to re-
duce the number of Justices.31 The only power of removal resting
311. Mean Median Range
Tenure of (in years):
Chief Justices 13.53 11.0 4-34
Associate Justices 15.68 15.0 1-36
All Justices 15.39 14.5 1-36
All Justices Since 1930 13.18 10.0 1-36
Justices Currently Sitting 12.67 12.0 1-26
Key U.S. Senate Members* 12.50 12.0 4-27
*Composed of chairmen of the sixteen standing Senate committees.
All Justices Justices Since 1930
Justices who died in office 48(50%) 6(27.2%)
Justices who retired/resigned 48 (50%) 16 (72.8%)
Average age at appointment 53.6 55.0
Justices appointed per President since 1869: 2.95
(approximately 1 Justice every 19.5 months)
Democrats Republicans
Justices appointed since 1930 15 (68.1%) 7 (31.9%)
Presidential tenure (in years) since 1930 32 (64.0%) 18 (36.0%)
Sources: 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS Ixxv-xcii
1 CONG. INDEX (CCH 10,501-517 (1981-82))
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Appendix A (10th ed. 1980)
312. See supra note 311.
313. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,
514 (1869).
314. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); supra note 311.
315. See generally Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights
Out Of The Federal Courts, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 129 (1981).
316. This is the consequence of the constitutional provision of life tenure. The indepen-
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with Congress is that which can be exercised through conviction
after impeachment; however, this power has not been frequently
used.31
Even without direct action of the other branches of the federal
government, the average tenure of Justices does not support the
fears engendered by the term "life" tenure. For instance, the me-
dian tenure of Justices currently sitting on the Supreme Court is
twelve years, which is also the median tenure of those United
States Senators who currently hold the powerful chairmanships of
the sixteen standing committees of the Senate.3 18 The median ten-
ure of all Supreme Court Justices ever appointed is a bit higher,
being fourteen and a half years; but considering only those justices
appointed since 1930, the median tenure is only ten years.31 '
It should also be noted that especially in recent years the Court
rarely speaks as with one mind. There are currently nine members
of the Court and these members frequently differ as to the consti-
tutional issues before the Court and as to the legitimacy of the
Court's power to interpret the Constitution expansively. In short,
the modern Court cannot be characterized as one single-mindedly
pursuing the aggrandisement of its own power.
The Court, though it exercises the power to interpret all provi-
sions of the Constitution, can only be accurately characterized as a
counter-majoritarian force when it makes law to implement the
constitutional protections for individual liberties. When it inter-
prets constitutional provisions which assign governmental powers
to the federal government or reserve powers to the states, a deci-
sion necessarily leaves to one or the other of these electorally-ac-
countable entities the particular power in issue. If, however, it
finds an individual to be constitutionally protected from govern-
mental control or punishment, the Court must restrict the power
of electorally-accountable officials to act. Although this action is
counter-majoritarian in that the decision of elected representa-
dence of Justices and of all article III judges is also assured by the provision that prevents
Congress from reducing their compensation during their term of office. See U.S. CONsT. art.
III, § 1.
317. See E. BARRETT, CONSTITtIONAL LAW 525 (5th ed. 1977). The only four convic-
tions obtained, however, were of judges. Id.
318. See supra note 311.
319. See supra note 311.
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tives, who assumedly represent the majority will,32 0 is frustrated,
the other effect is that all individuals in this society gain a freedom
from governmental intrusion or regulation. It is well accepted that
individual liberties were written into the Constitution for the very
purpose of protecting individuals against even the majority will.
These provisions, therefore, necessarily stand for the fundamental
proposition that in some instances even elected officials must be
limited in favor of the freedom of the people.
In another sense, to recognize that the Supreme Court exercises
important powers does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that
those powers should be limited. All governments, especially the
legislative and executive branches of the federal government, have
greatly increased in power since 1868. State and local governments
have grown to the extent that they touch the lives of individual
citizens in far more ways than did local government in the early
days of this country. With the continuing growth of government
and the ever-increasing pervasiveness of regulation, an individual's
protection from and control over his or her governors becomes
more difficult to maintain through the vote. One question that may
be asked then is whether the individual's place in society vis-a-vis
government can be maintained as intended by the framers of the
fourteenth amendment if it is read as applicable only to the condi-
tions prevailing in 1868.
One must also realize that as a consequence of restricting the
Court a power vacuum will be created which will be filled by other
governmental entities. Recent history should have provided suffi-
cient evidence to convince us that government tends to enlarge it-
self and to extend its reach regardless of the outcry of the voters.
Experience would indicate that government has continued to grow
in size and reach because the interests of government officials is
thereby served and that this interest is ever present and compel-
ling even in the face of complaints by the public. Although one
320. To argue this point requires one to overlook the many instances in which legisla-
tive bodies have acted in disregard of the popular will. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964). Even without considering instances in which special-interest legislation is enacted or
in which the political interests of legislators affect the laws enacted, common experience
indicates that elected representatives do not and probably cannot poll their constituents on
every issue. This is not to say this system should be abandoned, but reality does indicate




might wish it otherwise, the only truly effective restraint on the
power of government over an individual arises from an indepen-
dent Supreme Court with the power to adapt the Constitution to
the present realities of our society. As a result, the decision to re-
strain the Court's power to control government through the Con-
stitution would inevitably free government to engage in further
regulation and, in the case of equal protection, free government to
operate as its own will dictates regardless of relevant facts.
The people do, presumably, possess the power to amend the
Constitution so as to restrain government when it cannot be con-
trolled by the vote. If the fear is that government is out of control,
however, the people cannot hope for great success in obtaining pro-
tection in this manner since Congress itself has always proposed
constitutional amendments and the state legislatures ordinarily de-
termine whether they should be ratified.2 ' Moreover, if one is pri-
marily seeking protection against tyranny by the majority, amend-
ment of the Constitution is even less feasible since a super-
majority of three-fourths of the states must ratify a proposed
amendment before it can take effect." '
Amending the Constitution is, on the other hand, available as a
check on a Supreme Court which might abuse its powers. If the
Court ever reached this point it would not have failed to have en-
raged the majority of people and to have frustrated Congress and
the legislatures of the states.2 In addition to overruling particular
constitutional decisions, these governmental bodies, with their con-
trol over the amending process and with the support of an aroused
populace, could effectively halt the overreaching of such a destruc-
tive force by writing into the Constitution, what is presently ab-
sent, that is, a specific mode of legitimate constitutional interpre-
tation, the consistent violation of which could stand as an
impeachable offense.
What has been argued by some is that the Court has reached
this point by taking unto itself a power which is tantamount to the
power to amend the Constitution. The Court has "rewritten" the
321. U.S. CONST. art. V.
322. Id.
323. The process of constitutional amendment has been used four times in our history
to overrule constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 3-6, at 50-51 & n.8. (1978).
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Constitution, however, only if one first assumes that the only way
the Constitution can be "written" is as the framers specifically in-
tended. Raoul Berger argues that only by interpreting the four-
teenth amendment as the framers specifically intended can the
Court legitimately exercise its power of judicial review, but we
must remember that he is only presenting an argument. This argu-
ment is often made to appear as if it were founded on the one
indisputably legitimate basis for determining the validity of consti-
tutional law making, but the framers can no longer determine what
the Constitution means.2 4 Their power over the fourteenth
amendment ended with its ratification, and their intentions can
only be given constitutional significance to the extent present and
future generations decide to do so. It is our decision, not theirs,
which will determine the legitimacy of the Court's interpretation
and application of the Constitution, and that decision should not
be made without first deciding what part we wish the Constitution
to play in this society.
If instead of perceiving the Equal Protection Clause as contain-
ing a specific rule with a static meaning, one views it as the state-
ment of an ideal, the Court's extension of its protection beyond the
framers' intent no longer appears to be a rewriting or reinterpreta-
tion. Rather than revising the Constitution as it sees fit, the Court
can be seen as striving to achieve that demand. As an ideal, the
Equal Protection Clause represents the framers' vision of a state of
perfect freedom from arbitrary unequal treatment and their deci-
sion to commit the nation to the pursuit of this ultimate goal.
Should we not assume that the framers knew it was a Constitution
they were amending and thus in order for their proposal to have
significance for future generations also knew it must be flexible
enough to stand as a guide even when totally unforeseen conditions
and problems arose? As a constitutional commitment to such a
goal of perfect equality, the Equal Protection Clause will have per-
petual significance since no matter what advances are made in our
imperfect society, perfect equality will never be achieved. This is
324. As Terrance Sandalow put it, we use history to help us "see more clearly the
choices we now confront. Yet, however useful an understanding of the past may be in clari-
fying those choices, it cannot determine our response to them. That prerogative-and bur-




the essential value of an ideal; because it can never be completely
attained, it will always continue to exist as a guide. Most signifi-
cant, however, is the commitment to the pursuit of that ideal for
this commitment assures future generations that the Constitution
will stand as an effective force regardless of the different forms of
unjustifiable inequality which appear.
This conception of the Equal Protection Clause is also in accor-
dance with the popular view of the Constitution as a symbol of the
American ethos of limited government and as a document contain-
ing the formal statements evidencing this nation's perpetual com-
mitment to individual freedom. Should the Constitution become
limited in its current significance to those specific problems con-
fronted by its framers and consequently no longer a guide for a
modern generation confronted by different concerns, it will lose its
power not only as law but also as a symbol. It would then truly be
little more than a "prolix code" which gradually would become of
interest only to historians.
This is not to say that only the Supreme Court can protect the
Constitution and guide the pursuit toward its ideals or that the
Court cannot abuse the powers allowed it. To dismantle the mech-
anism which through our history has fulfilled this function, how-
ever, requires strong evidence that the Court has gone seriously
wrong in moving us toward constitutional ideals. Radical change in
a system which has brought us to a point of personal freedom une-
qualed by other nations requires more than disagreement with par-
ticular decisions or the undifferentiated fear that the Court may go
too far. It seems irrefutable that if the Equal Protection Clause is
to have continued significance in a society in which changing con-
ditions and novel societal problems are the rule, some entity must
be allowed discretion to react to new, unforeseen inequities. The
Supreme Court is insulated from the political process and can,
therefore, more freely make decisions which would be too politi-
cally dangerous for elected officials. The protection from unequal
treatment of those who, as has been seen in the cases, do not pos-
sess influence, wealth, or potential voting power can realistically
only come from such an entity. It is to be expected that when the
Court does act to protect these groups which have historically been
the victims of the majority's prejudices, that the majority or at
least the dominant factions in society would become hostile to the
Court. The existence of this hostility does not mean the Court has
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abused its power, only that it has exercised it.
In determining whether the Court has so abused its power to
pursue through constitutional law the ideal of equal protection,
one must look to those cases which represent significantly new ap-
plications of equal protection and consider whether they evidence
a pattern of consistently unjustifiable decisions. While considering
these individual decisions, one should hold in abeyance the con-
cern prompted by claims that the Court is acting illegitimately by
making equal protection law beyond the intent of the framers. The
tendency of critics is often to determine the legitimacy of a consti-
tutional decision solely by reference to the value of the standard
used as a limit on the Court's power. Yet, the ultimate question
can only be whether the Court has so consistently acted contrary
to our conception of the Constitution that it should be limited by a
force outside its own control.
In reviewing the cases previously discussed, one general charac-
teristic can be seen. The circumstances of those cases pose situa-
tions which all to some extent touch one's sense of fairness. To put
it another way, it can be said that in each of these cases the Court
was prompted to act as it did at least in part by its sense of justice
or concern for fair and equal treatment. This kind of concern has
contributed to the Court's formulation of its equal protection
analysis.
Although thoughtful members of the public, assuming they had
the power and the obligation to decide these cases, might have de-
cided differently, these decisions evidence a Court which has acted
reasonably and responsibily to pursue an ideal of equality. The
Court's conception of this ideal does not require equal treatment of
all or perfect equality of effects; it is founded on the premise that
equal protection must instead prohibit arbitrary governmental
classifications or differentiation. This notion permits the existence
of that flexibility necessary to deal adequately with novel problems
and allows the Court to strike down those actions that emanate
from the desire to maintain society according to the preconcep-
tions of the politically powerful. The history of equal protection
has, therefore, been a history of the constitutional erosion of the
government's power to rule without reason, to treat similarly quali-
fied persons differently because of what officials think of them, to
lump people together for group treatment without regard for their
individual merit or ability, and to treat people unequally so as to
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serve the personal interests of the decisionmakers rather than the
interests of the public.
It must be admitted that in acting upon its own sense of fairness
and equality the Supreme Court has not developed a formal pro-
cess of analysis which narrowly channels its discretion. One would,
of course, hope that with conscious development the process would
become better defined and standardized; but as long as we wish
the Court to possess, at least in part, the power to do justice while
making constitutional law, we must realize that discretion is
required.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to constitutional authorization that it establish a uni-
form rule of naturalization,1 Congress has exercised its power at
various times and has established procedures and prerequisites to
the attainment of citizenship by the foreign-born.2 One such pre-
* B.A. 1974, St. Mary's University; M.S. 1976, Trinity University; J.D. 1979, Harvard
Law School; Associate, Groce, Locke & Hebdon, San Antonio, Texas. The author wishes to
express his appreciation to Abram Chages, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School, for reading the manuscript and offering suggestions.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. Historically, naturalization has been the subject of numerous statutes and at least 46
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requisite is that a candidate for naturalization must demonstraate
"an understanding of the English language, including an ability to
read, write, and speak words in ordinary usage in the English lan-
guage . . . ."s After an examination of its legislative history and
underlying rationale, this author argues that the English literacy
requirement should be declared unconstitutional because of its dis-
criminatory intent and impact on discernible citizen groups. Al-
though there are "common sense" overtones that an English-
speaking nation can and should legitimately require foreigners it
naturalizes to speak, read, and write the national language, often
what is termed "common sense" contains underlying elements of
xenophobia.' Especially in the area of immigration and naturaliza-
tion, many of the attitudes that today go unquestioned are incon-
sistent and repugnant to principles and practices that are widely
accepted under our constitutional, republican form of government.
This article suggests that the literacy provision is a by-product of
ideas and attitudes that are linked more to nativism and ethnocen-
trism rather than to the rational purposes the common sense justi-
fication readily assumes.
II. THE JUSTICIABILITY OF LEGAL OBJECTIONS TO NATURALIZATION
POLICY
The first major obstacle to a constitutional challenge to the En-
glish literacy requirement is that the Judicial branch has viewed
enactments under the constitutional authority to establish a uni-
form rule of naturalization as being intimately related to the pow-
ers of the Executive and Legislative branches to conduct foreign
affairs 5 and influenced by internationally accepted concepts of sov-
ereignty;' thus, the Judicial branch has determined that as a policy
separate treaties. See generally C. HYATT & E. AVERY, LAWS APPLICABLE TO IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY (1953). Current naturalization provisions are found in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1458 (1976).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4. Cf. Hull, Resident Aliens And The Equal Protection Clause: The Burger Court's
Retreat From Graham v. Richardson, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 38 (1980).
5. See notes 14-16 infra and accompanying text.
6.
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the en-
trance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.
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